Programme & Information
Tunisia Spring School 2013
The State in the Muslim World
L'Etat dans le monde musulman

Mon 18 - Fri 22 March 2013
Hammamet - Tunisia

Contents

Introduction

The Tunesia Spring School 2013 takes place from Monday 18 until Friday 22 March 2013 in Hammamet, Tunesia. The overall theme of the spring school is 'The State in Muslim World'. This year's Spring School deals with the multiple relations between Islam and politics. Over the last few decades, Islam has become a central point of reference for a wide range of activists and opposition movements active in the political domain. Many analysts of current developments in the Arab world also point to this direction. During the lectures and workshops in Hammamet, we will shed light on the relations between Islam and politics from past to present, both in and outside the Arab world.

The Spring School's organisation is a joint effort by:

- The Netherlands Interuniversity School for Islamic Studies (NISIS)
- The Institut d'études de l'Islam et des sociétés du monde musulman (IISMM)
- Institut de recherche sur le Maghreb contemporain (IRMC)
- Université de Tunis

In close cooperation with:

- Institut de recherche pour le développement (IRD, Paris)
- Laboratoire DIRASET, Faculté des sciences humaines et sociales, Université de Tunis
- Ecole Doctorale, Université de Tunis
- Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines, Université de Sousse

It is with great pleasure that we welcome you to what promises to be a fruitful Spring School!

Professor Léon Buskens, Leiden University, director of NISIS

Professor Gabriel Martinez-Gros, Université Paris X, IISMM

Professor Pierre-Noël Denieuil, director of IRMC

Professor Abdelhamid Hénia, Université de Tunis

NISIS

NISIS is a national research school in the field of Islam and Muslim societies. It brings together eight Dutch universities, their faculty, and PhD candidates. Participating universities are the University of Amsterdam, VU University Amsterdam, Utrecht University, University of Groningen, Tilburg University, Radboud University Nijmegen, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Leiden University.

Aims of NISIS

- cooperation on a national basis: bringing together education, research, and expertise in the Netherlands on Islam and Muslim societies;
- joining various disciplines dealing with Islamic studies: especially from the humanities, social sciences, and legal studies;
- educating a new generation of researchers: funding, education, and supervision of PhD candidates, as well as training of research master students;
- international outreach: making Dutch scholarship on Islam and Muslim societies known to an international audience and bringing Dutch students in contact with foreign scholars and students;

- public outreach: increasing the visibility of scholarship on Islam and Muslim societies in the Netherlands.

NISIS Training Programme

NISIS contributes to successful completion of individual research master or dissertation projects in the domain of the study of Islam and Muslim societies by providing a Training Programme. The NISIS Training Programme offers a NISIS Spring and Autumn School of 4 EC each and a yearly Islamic Studies Network Day of 1 EC.

For more information about NISIS and the Training Programme, please visit: www.nisis.nl

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THE INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC STUDIES AND MUSLIM WORLD SOCIETIES (INSTITUT D'ÉTUDES DE L'ISLAM ET DES SOCIETES DU MONDE MUSULMAN) | IISMM

IISMM
96 boulevard Raspail, 75006 Paris
+33 (0)1 53 63 56 05
iismm@ehess.fr
http://iismm.ehess.fr/

The Institute of Islamic Studies and Muslim World Societies (IISMM) was created in May 1999 as a part of the School of Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences (EHESS). More than a research center on the Muslim world, IISMM is a space for dialogue, a structure for scientific cooperation which relies on EHESS resources to launch partnerships with other research groups as well as promote ties between researchers, both in France and abroad. What sets IISMM apart from other

institutions is the fact that it does not have its own researchers but works with researchers from a variety of disciplines on a voluntary basis. IISMM also calls upon these researchers for their expertise to participate in conferences, seminars, and professional training sessions open to a larger public.

Missions:

Supporting Research on the Muslim World:

- by promoting an interdisciplinary approach between social sciences
- by closing the gap between geographic areas and revealing the diversity of "islams" in order to spread better understanding of Islam
- by helping new thematic researches to emerge
- by bringing support to young researchers, PhD students and post-PhD students studying issues concerning the Muslim World

Spread Knowledge on Islam and the Muslim World to Different Publics:

The relationship between encouraging and supporting research, on the one side, and making knowledge available, on the other side, constitutes the most innovative and challenging part of the activities of IISMM. It offers researchers the opportunity to develop their work while testing the reception of knowledge within specific circles.

INSTITUT DE RECHERCHE SUR LE MAGHREB CONTEMPORAIN
(IRMC - CNRS-USR 3077)

20 rue Mohamed Ali Tahar

1002, Tunis Mutuelleville

Tél : 71 796 722 - Fax : 71 797 376

Mél : direction@irmcmaghreb.org

Site internet : http://www.irmcmaghreb.org

Directeur de l'IRMC : M. Pierre-Noël DENIEUIL

Créé à Tunis en 1992, l'Institut de recherche sur le Maghreb contemporain (IRMC) est un centre de recherche en sciences humaines et sociales à vocation régionale placé sous la tutelle du ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes ainsi que du Ministère de l'Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche. Depuis 2000, l'IRMC constitue une unité de service et de recherche (USR 3077) du Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS). L'Institut est un lieu d'accueil et de pratique scientifique qui a pour vocation de contribuer, en partenariat avec la communauté scientifique maghrébine, française et internationale, à produire des savoirs sur la région du "Grand Maghreb arabe" (Tunisie, Algérie, Libye, Maroc, Mauritanie), à consolider et à former une nouvelle génération de chercheurs en sciences humaines et sociales.

Champs disciplinaires

Anthropologie, démographie, droit, économie, études urbaines, géographie, histoire, sciences politiques, sociologie, sciences sociales appliquées aux lettres, à la philosophie et à la psychologie.

Organisation stratégique

Un Comité d'orientation et un Conseil scientifique participent à la détermination des orientations de travail, à l'évaluation des activités et au recrutement. Un Comité mixte de suivi franco-tunisien des activités de l'IRMC se réunit chaque année.

Location

IBEROSTAR SAPHIR PALACE
Boulevard 7 Novembre
Hammamet Yasmine
Tunisia
CP: 08052
Tel.: 00216 72 241 600
Fax: 00216 72 241 222
E-mail: saphir.palace@iberostar.tn

Morning sessions   **keynotes lectures & final session**
                              Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, Friday

Large conference room / grand salle de conférence

Afternoon sessions   **parallel workshops**
                              Monday, Tuesday, Thursday

1. Large conference room transformed into workshop room / grande salle de
   conférence transformée en salle d'atelier
2. Kelibia room / salle Kelibia
3. Haouaria room / salle Haouaria.

Tunisia Spring School – Programme and time schedule

Monday 18 March

<u>Morning session</u>:

09.00-9.30:	Registration
09.30-10.00:	**Opening and introduction of the Spring School** by:
	Professor Pierre-Noël Denieuil (director IRMC)
	Professor Gabriel Martinez-Gros (IISMM)
	Dr Nico Landman (NISIS/Utrecht University)
	Professor Moncef Ben Abdeljelil (University of Sousse)
Chair:	Dr Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron (co-director IISMM)
10.00-10.45:	**Keynote lecture 1 by Dr Alia Gana** (CNRS Paris/ IRMC Tunis) entitled 'Elections, territorial inequalities and legitimacy in post-revolutionary Tunisia.'
10.45-11.15:	Questions and discussion
11.15-11.45:	Coffee and tea break
11.45-12.30:	**Keynote lecture 2 by Professor Gabriel Martinez-Gros** (IISMM), entitled 'Ibn Khaldun's Theory of the state and city.'
12.30-13.00:	Questions and discussion
13.00-14.30:	Lunch break

<u>Afternoon programme: 3 parallel workshops</u>

Workshop 1:	**Intellectual Debates**
Chair:	Professor Gabriel Martinez-Gros (IISMM)
14.30-14.45:	Presentation 1, by Pieter Coppens (NISIS/Utrecht University): 'Tafsīr as a source for history: the case of Shams al-Dīn al-Daylamī.'
14.45-15.00:	Questions and discussion

15.00-15.15:	Presentation 2, by Sami al-Daghistani (Leiden University): 'Encountering ethics and economy within the Islamic state in the writings of Imam Al Ghazali.'
15.15-15.30:	Questions and discussion
15.30-16.00:	Coffee and tea break
16.00-16.15:	Presentation 3, by Fatma Moumni (University of Tunis): ' Notre sujet est intitulé l'impact de la pensée de David Hume sur la philosophie d'Auguste Comte.'
16.15-16.30:	Questions and discussion
16.30-16.45:	Presentation 4, Munir Ikhwan (Free University of Berlin): 'Rethinking the Qur'an in an Era of Nation-states: Quraish Shihab's Vision on the Differentiation of Religious and "Secular" Spheres.'
16.45-17.00:	Questions and discussion

Workshop 2: **Religious and Secular Elites**

Chair:	Dr Jan Jaap de Ruiter (NISIS/Tilburg University)
14.30-14.45:	Presentation 1, by Mahmood Kooria (Leiden University): 'Intertwined Dar al Harb and Dar al Islam: Ulamas of Aceh and Ponnani and their Political Attachments with West-Asian Sultanates.'
14.45-15.00:	Questions and discussion
15.00-15.15:	Presentation 2, by Imanol Ortega (Granada University): 'The Turkish–Islamic synthesis: The political project of AKP and Kemalist (secular and nationalist) elites.'
15.15-15.30:	Questions and discussion
15.30-16.00:	Coffee and tea break

16.00-16.15:	Presentation 3, by Charlotte Courreye (INALCO, Paris): 'The Association of Algerian Muslim 'Ulamâ' and the construction of the independent Algerian state: heritage, appropriation and antagonisms (1954-1991).'
16.15-16.30:	Questions and discussion
16.30-16.45:	Presentation 4, by Pierre France (Université Paris 1 – Panthéon Sorbonne): 'Lebanese elites during the civil war and legal legitimacy in Lebanon.'
16.45-17.00:	Questions and discussion

Workshop 3 :   **Political and Religious Change**

Chair:	Professor Pierre-Noël Denieuil (Director IRMC)
14.30-14.45:	Presentation 1, by Anna Grasso (INALCO): 'The evolution in the relationship between State and religion in postrevolutionary Tunisia one year after the elections of the Constituent Assembly.'
14.45-15.00:	Questions and discussion
15.00-15.15:	Presentation 2, by Alexis Blouet (Université Paris 1 – Panthéon Sorbonne): 'Egypt towards a civil state?.'
15.15-15.30:	Questions and discussion
15.30-16.00:	Coffee and tea break
16.00-16.15:	Presentation 3, by Saida Ounissi (Université Paris 1 –Panthéon Sorbonne): 'Entre mise en œuvre des politiques sociales et violence légitime, comment assurer la continuité de l'Etat en Tunisie?.'
16.15-16.30:	Questions and discussion
16.30-16.45:	Presentation 4, by Mushlihin Amali (Leiden University): 'Negotiating National Citizenship: State's Educational Responses to Islamist Schools In Post-Authoritarian Indonesia.'
16.45-17.00:	Questions and discussion

Tuesday 19 March

Chair:	Dr Alia Gana (CNRS Paris/IRMC Tunis)
09.30-10.15:	**Keynote lecture 3 by Professor Anne Marie Moulin** (CNRS/Paris VII/IISMM) entitled 'Viewing the Moslem States through the Lens of their Public Health Policies.'
10.15-10.45:	Questions and discussion
10.45-11.15:	Coffee and tea break
11.15-12.00:	**Keynote lecture 4 by Dr Jan Jaap de Ruiter** (NISIS/Tilburg University), entitled 'How to turn the tide: the alleged Islamization of the Netherlands.'
12.00-12.30:	Questions and discussion
12.30-14.00:	Lunch break

Afternoon programme: 3 parallel workshops

Workshop 4:	**Politics of Law and Justice**
Chair:	Dr Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron (co-director IISMM)
14.00-14.15:	Presentation 1, by Samer Ghamroun (Ecole normale supérieure de Cachan): 'Scrutinizing the weak state: juvenile justice, sharia courts and legal mobilizations in Lebanon.'
14.15-14.30:	Questions and discussion
14.30-14.45:	Presentation 2, by Matthieu Rey (EHESS, Paris): 'Ending the Rule of Law in Syria and Iraq (1958-1963).'
14.45-15.00:	Questions and discussion
15.00-15.30:	Coffee and tea break
15.30-15.45:	Presentation 3, by Mouna Bouhajja (University of Tunis): 'The state of law in constitutional and administrative jurisprudence.'

15.45-16.00:	Questions and discussions
16.00-16.15:	Presentation 4, by Sophie Lemiere (Sciences Po Paris): 'Gangsters and Masters: Connivance Militantism and Criminalisation of the State in Contemporary Malaysia.'
16.15-16.30:	Questions and discussion

Workshop 5: **Reform and Colonial Politics**

Chair:	Dr Jan Jaap de Ruiter (NISIS/Tilburg University)
14.00-14.15:	Presentation 1, by Maryse Kruithof (NISIS/Erasmus University Rotterdam): 'The Dutch Colonial State and Religious Affairs.'
14.15-14.30:	Questions and discussion
14.30-14.45:	Presentation 2, Simon Najm (EHESS, Paris): 'The challenges of Military Conscription and Badal al askariye after the Tanzimat on the Rum Orthodox Community of Syria (1839-1920).'
14.45-15.00:	Questions and discussion
15.00-15.30:	Coffee and tea break
15.30-15.45:	Presentation 3, Nessim Znaiem (Université Paris 1-Panthéon Sorbonne): 'Government and the control of Alcohol trade in Tunisia during colonization (1881-1956).'
15.45-16.00:	Questions and discussion

Workshop 6: **Gender and Space**

Chair:	Professor Anne Marie Moulin (CNRS/Paris VII/IISMM)
14.00-14.15:	Presentation 1, by Annemarie van Geel (NISIS/Radboud University Nijmegen): 'The Relationship between the State and the Religious Field in the Creation of Women-Only Public Spaces in Saudi Arabia.'
14.15-14.30:	Questions and discussion

14.30-14.45:	Presentation 2, by Oussama Boufrikha (Université de Sousse): 'The protesting spaces and its symbolic systems: anthropological approach to Ibadism in M'zab.'
14.45-15.00:	Questions and discussion
15.00-15.30:	Coffee and tea break
15.30-15.45:	Presentation 3, by Henda Ghribi (University of Tunis): 'The niqâb as a revealing of identity and social mutation.'
15.45-16.00:	Questions and discussion
16.00-16.15:	Presentation 4, by Mourad Mhenni (University of Tunis): 'L'État et la structuration des sociétés locales l'exemple des villages pilotes de la Basse vallée de la Medjerda.'
16.15-16.30:	Questions and discussion

Wednesday 20 March

Excursion to Tunis

10.00:	Departure by bus from hotel in Hammamet to Tunis
11.00:	Arrival at the Bardo museum Tunis
11.00-13.00:	Visit the museum
13.00-14.30:	Collective lunch at restaurant "Dar Slah"
14.30- ±16.30:	Guided tour in the Medina (by Ms Jamila Binous, ancienne professeur à l'Institut National du Patrimoine)
±16.30-21.00:	Free time for everyone
21.00:	Departure from Tunis Medina to the hotel in Hammamet. Location from where the bus departs: av. Habib Bourguiba
22.00:	Arrival at hotel in Hammamet

Thursday 21 March

Chair: Professor Thijl Sunier (NISIS/ VU University Amsterdam)

09.30-10.15:   **Keynote lecture 5 by by Professor Moncef Ben Abdeljelil** (University of Sousse), entitled 'The sixth Khilâfa: a Lapsus Linguae?'

10.15-10.45:   Questions and discussion

10.45-11.15:   Coffee and tea break

11.15-12.00:   **Keynote lecture 6 by Professor Gerard Wiegers** (NISIS/ University of Amsterdam) entitled 'Ottoman politics vis-à-vis Europe and the migration of Moriscos from Spain to Tunis.'

12.00-12.30:   Questions and discussion

12.30- 14.00:   Lunch break

Afternoon programme: 3 parallel workshops

Workshop 7:   **Media**

Chair: Professor Anne Marie Moulin (CNRS/Paris VII/IISMM)

14.00-14.15:   Presentation 1, by Sunarwoto (NISIS/Tilburg University): 'Finding the State's Legitimacy: Radio Dakwah in the political context.'

14.15-14.30:   Questions and discussion

14.30-14.45:   Presentation 2, by Raoudha Maghraoui (University of Tunis): 'Représentation métaphorique et caricaturale du contexte-socio-politique tunisien à travers une lecture sémiologique du discours publicitaire tunisien : étude de cas.'

14.45-15.00:   Questions and discussion

15.00-15.30:   Coffee and tea break

15.30-15.45:	Presentation 3, by Ahmad Nuril Huda (NISIS/Leiden University): 'Santri's Film Practices and Political Islam in Contemporary Indonesian Cinema.'
15.45-16.00:	Questions and discussion
16.00-16.15:	Presentation 4, by Omar Adam Sayfo (Utrecht University): 'Religious education in Arab Childrens Television and Animated Cartoons.'
16.15-16.30:	Questions and discussion

Workshop 8:   Institutions and Policies

Chair:	Dr Nico Landman (NISIS/Utrecht University)
14.00-14.15:	Presentation 1, by Thomas Claes (Free University of Berlin): 'The Role of Religious Institutions in shaping State-Religion Relations in Egypt.'
14.15-14.30:	Questions and discussion
14.30-14.45:	Presentation 2, by Claudie Fioroni (IHEID, Geneva): 'Politics at Work And Politics for Work in Jordan.'
14.45-15.00:	Questions and discussion
15.00-15.30:	Coffee and tea break
15.30-15.45:	Presentation 3, by Azza Bchir (Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne): 'Boundaries between political sphere and the religion symbolic norms: The use of scenarios methodology.'
15.45-16.00:	Questions and discussion
16.00-16.15:	Presentation 4, by Molka Belhadj (University of Tunis): 'The Executive Privilege of the American President.'
16.15-16.30:	Questions and discussion

Workshop 9:   **Diversity, Minorities and Tensions**

Chair: Professor Gerard Wiegers (NISIS/ University of Amsterdam)

14.00-14.15:   Presentation 1, Racha Ben Abdeljelil-Gamha (University of Tunis):
                  'The governing of San'a' by the Zaydi dynasty.'

14.15-14.30:   Questions and discussion

14.30-14.45:   Presentation 2, Marloes Hamelink (Utrecht University): 'Zanzibar,
                  Tanzania and national and religious tensions.'

14.45-15.00:   Questions and discussion

15.00-15.30:   Coffee and tea break

15.30-15.45:   Presentation 3, Tamás Szenderák (Eötvös Loránd University):
                  'The function of state in the light of FatwÁs on QÁt Consumption.'

15.45-16.00:   Questions and discussion

Friday 22 March

Final session

Chair: Professor Gabriel Martinez-Gros (IISMM)

Panelists: Professor Moncef Ben Abdeljelil (University of Sousse)

                    Professor Thijl Sunier (NISIS/ VU University Amsterdam)

                    Alexis Blouet (University Paris 1- Panthéon Sorbonne)

                    Annemarie van Geel (NISIS/Radboud University Nijmegen)

                    Henda Ghribi (University of Tunis)

                    Marloes Hamelink (Utrecht University)

9.30-10.30:   Final session part I

10.30-11.00:   Coffee and tea break

11.00-12.00:   Final session part II

Keynote lectures: speakers, abstracts and biographies

Dr Alia Gana (CNRS Paris/IRMC Tunis): 'Elections, territorial inequalities and legitimacy in post-revolutionnary Tunisia.'

By giving a comfortable advance to the Islamist party of Ennahdha (around 37% of the votes), the first free elections of independent Tunisia on the 23rd October 2011 have taken by surprise most observers. In this presentation, we identify the social and socio-territorial bases of major Tunisian parties through combining geographical analyses at different scales and qualitative surveys in specific localities. While most interpretations of the electoral results have focused on the "Modernist vs. conservative cleavage", thus overlooking the socio-economic class cleavage, our analyses point to the very differentiated socio-territorial electoral bases of the main parties, indicating deep social differences in voting behavior, especially within cities. In addition, the consensus expressed by most parties about the need to reduce regional inequalities – and hence its apparent irrelevance as a structuring cleavage – hides very dissimilar voting behaviour in peripheral and metropolitan areas. While allowing for a better interpretation of electoral results, our analyses also provide tools to understand possible evolutions of the Tunisian political space.

Alia GANA is research professor at CNRS (University of Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne) and is currently stationed at IRMC, Tunis. Holding a PhD in development sociology (Cornell University), she has done extensive research in the Mediterranean region on issues such as social systems of farm production and rural livelihoods, agricultural policies, natural resource management, gender and social movements in rural areas. Her current research activities focus on territorial development, local governance and political transition processes. At IRMC she coordinates an interdisciplinary research program in electoral analyses, which

associates researchers from Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia and France. Her most recent publications include: Gana A., 2012. "The Rural and Agricultural Roots of the Tunisian Revolution: When Food Security Matters", *Int. Jrnl. of Soc. of Agr. & Food*, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 201–213. Gana A. & al., 2012. "La territorialité du vote pour l'Assemblée nationale constituante en Tunisie", *Confluences méditerranéennes*, n°82, 2012, 51 à 69. Gana A., Van Hamme G., Ben Rabeh M., 2012. "Géographie électorale et disparités socio-territoriales: les enseignements des élections pour l'assemblée constituante en Tunisie", *L'Espace Politique*, 2012-3, n°18. http://espacepolitique.revues.org/index2486.html. Gana A. 2013. "Poverty Alleviation through Microcredit: Rural Women's Empowerment in Tunisia", *Journal of Law and Public Policy* Volume 22, Issue 3.

Professor Gabriel Martinez-Gros (IISMM): 'Ibn Khaldun's theory of the state and city.'

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1) The State creates a 'sedentary' society by taxation, which transforms the violence and solidarities natural to men into prosperity, into ever-growing resources and populations. Those disarmed, individualistic, productive and tax-suffering populations are called 'sedentary'

2) In order to collect peacefully taxes, the State tends to eradicate any kind of violence and solidarity in its realm, including the violence that supports its own existence. There is no State prone to war; every State is peaceful by definition. Ibn Khaldûn insists on the structural weakness of the State and on its tendency to suicide by disarmament.

3) The State success in its effort to control violence leaves it defenceless, forces it to hire mercenary violence, increases the cost of its army, and ruins the public finances and the civil society it was supposed to enrich.

4) The true pattern of the State, according to Ibn Khaldun, is the Empire, with no rival at sight – the Roman Empire, the Chinese Empire, The Islamic Abbasid Empire.... The Empire gathers under its control the main part of the productive territories at reach. Its only neighbours are Bedouins, harassing it or hired by it.

5) Every city begins being a capital, founded by a State, and its taxation system. A city is a cumulative engine of population, resources and memory. By mobilizing its overwhelming workforce, the city yields the only possible gains of productivity in an otherwise stagnant agrarian society. The cities are the savings and treasuries of mankind.

6) Many cities have disappeared with their founding dynasties. Some resisted the loss of their political power by displaying an unmatched ability to save the memory of civilization, and to attract new powers.

Professor Anne Marie Moulin (CNRS/Paris VII/IISMM): 'Viewing the Moslem States through the Lens of their Public Health Policies.'

The analysis of Public Health provides an original perspective on modern Moslem States. The Moslem State has been analysed as an import from the West and a marker of dependence on a foreign model or as an institution still in the making, limited by the persisting domination of religion. A comparative view of the history of Public Health in the Moslem States challenges both views and reveals a diversity of situations resulting from the sociocultural contexts as much as the international order. There is a continuity between the charitable works of *daoula* as a dynasty (hospitals and foundations) and the support provided to Public Health by *daoula* as a modern State. Moslem states display a variety of policies which feature tradition allied to modernity, and are not reducible to an external model.

I have selected two periods of times to show how Moslem states have organized the institutions of medical learning and the regulation of medical practice as part of their programs of technical updating and population control, based on the "govermentality" of the bodies : the 19th century Reform Era (Egypt, Ottoman Empire, Persia) ; the post-colonial era, marked by the emergence of the Wellfare State (Maghreb, Gulf). Public Health articulates the functions of the State and the claims of societies, and offers a means of assessing the efficacy of the former and the satisfaction of the latter.

Today, with the globalization and the increasing trend of liberalism and retreat of the State, the access to care remains a touchstone of the State agency and of its response to citizens' needs. In this domain, not unlike education, the unwillingness or inability of the Moslem State is doomed to foster internal disorders, even if it gives more chance to the civil society to raise critics and assume new roles, as the definition of health and its individual and collective norms and components is redeployed.

'La santé publique: un point de vue original sur l'histoire des Etats musulmans aux 19ème et 20ème siècles.'

La santé a été énoncée comme un droit des populations par l'OMS en 1947. Mais depuis le 19ème siècle au moins, les états musulmans lui ont fait une place importante dans leurs réformes, inaugurant une « médicalisation de la société », objet d'un « biopouvoir », fondé sur la « gouvernementalité » des corps.

La thèse de « l'Etat importé », qui suppose un emprunt à l'Occident d'un Etat universel renvoyant à la raison ou d'un « Etat inachevé » en raison de ses accointances avec le religieux, doit être contextualisée. Je montrerai la richesse et la variété d'expériences en rapport avec les contextes sociaux et culturels autant que l'ordre international. Les états musulmans allient la recherche d'un développement technologique synonyme de modernité avec l'affirmation d'une continuité

(symbolisée par le terme de *daoula*) avec la science passée et le mécénat princier (fondations). Pour l'illustrer, je retracerai l'histoire de la santé publique, à travers deux périodes :

- l'ère des réformes au 19ème siècle (Egypte, Empire ottoman, Perse) ;
- de la fin du XXe siècle à nos jours, l'organisation de l'Etat Providence dans les états nouvellement indépendants (Maghreb et Etats du Golfe).

La santé fournit une pierre de touche de la façon dont l'Etat remplit ses fonctions et répond aux besoins de la population en matière de soins. Aujourd'hui, la tendance est à la globalisation et à la libéralisation. L'incapacité ou le refus de l'Etat dans le domaine de la santé devrait susciter des désordres sociaux qui ne seront pas nécessairement compensés par l'opportunité ainsi offerte à la société civile d'exercer sa critique et d'inventer de nouveaux rôles, au moment où la définition de la santé individuelle et collective est un enjeu partagé par de multiples acteurs sociaux et religieux.

Anne Marie Moulin is a M.D. and a Ph.D in philosophy, directeur de recherche CNRS, Unité SPHERE/Paris VII University and an associate professor in public health at the Senghor University of Alexandria, Egypt. **Anne Marie Moulin** est médecin et agrégée de philosophie, directeur de recherche CNRS, Unité SPHERE (Sciences, Philosophie, Histoire), Paris VII, et professeur associée de santé publique, Université Senghor, Alexandrie, Egypte.

Dr Jan Jaap de Ruiter (Tilburg University): 'How to turn the tide: the alleged Islamization of the Netherlands.'

The supporters of the claim that Islam is organizing itself in the Western world, i.e. Europe and the United States and Canada, in order to force the introduction and application of Islamic law, Sharia, consider Islam as an ideology that is aggressive

by nature. As such they consider every Muslim as a potential threat to national and world peace. They speak of the alleged "Islamization" of the world: Muslims seeking to take over the whole world and apply Sharia everywhere. The supporters of the concept of Islamization do not miss an opportunity, pointing at the violence 'Muslims' use everywhere in the world, to substantiate their claims. The block of Islamization is becoming stronger and stronger and their ideas are more and more, though in different measures, filtering into media, politics and public. The Islamization claim is widespread in the Western world. Some of its supporters are American activist Geller, British-Egyptian writer Gisèle Littman a.k.a. Bat Ye'or, and researchers Solomon and Al Maqdisi . In my contribution I will treat the body of thought of the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), the national Dutch champion of the Islamization claim, as expressed in the work of Party ideologue Martin Bosma in his 2010 publication *The fake elite of the counterfeiters* and the 2012 book of Geert Wilders, Party leader, *Marked for Death. Islam's War Against the West and Me*. I analyze which themes stand central in this ideology, what are its possible consequences and how does it work out in Dutch society, in particular in its Muslim community.

'Comment inverser la tendance: l'islamisation des Pays-Bas présumé.'
Les partisans de la thèse selon laquelle l'islam est en train de s'organiser dans le monde occidental, à savoir l'Europe, les Etats-Unis et le Canada, afin de forcer l'introduction et l'application de la loi islamique, la charia, considèrent l'islam comme une idéologie qui est agressive par nature. Comme tels, ils considèrent tous les musulmans comme une menace potentielle pour la paix nationale et mondiale. Ils parlent de la prétendue «islamisation» du monde: les musulmans cherchent à conquérir le monde entier et d'appliquer la charia partout. Les partisans du concept d'islamisation ne manquent pas aucune occasion, en montrant que les «musulmans» utilisent de la violence partout dans le monde, à l'appui de leurs revendications. Le

bloc de l'islamisation est de plus en plus fort et ses idées sont de plus en plus, bien que dans des mesures différentes, filtrées dans les médias, la politique et parmi le public. Le 'mouvement de l'islamisation' est très répandu dans le monde occidental. Certains de ses partisans sont Pamela Geller, activiste américain, l'écrivain égyptien-anglais Gisèle Littman alias Bat Ye'or, et les chercheurs Salomon et Al Maqdisi. Dans ma contribution, je vais traiter du corps de la pensée du Parti néerlandais pour la Liberté (PVV), champion néerlandais du thèse de l'islamisation, tel qu'il est exprimé dans le 2010 publication du Parti idéologue Martin Bosma *L'élite hypocrite des faussaires* et le 2012 livre de Geert Wilders, chef du parti, *Condamné à mort. La guerre de l'Islam contre l'Occident et moi*. J'analyse les thèmes centraux de cette idéologie, lesquelles sont ses conséquences possibles et comment elle influence la société néerlandaise, en particulier sa communauté musulmane.

Dr Jan Jaap de Ruiter is a university lecturer at Tilburg University (Tilburg School of Humanities, Department of Culture Studies). His interests include the status and role of the Arabic language and of the religion of Islam in Western Europe and Morocco. His publications, in diverse languages, among which French, centre on these themes and he participates in the debate on Arabic and Islam in national and international contexts. He participated in many Dutch and European Research and Development Projects.

Professor Moncef Ben Abdeljelil (University of Sousse, Tunisia): 'The sixth Khilâfa A Lapsus Linguae?'

The expression of "the Sixth Khilâfa" has been pronounced months ago by the current Tunisian Prime Minister and stimulated wide discussions among Tunisians. The aim of the session is to focus on some aspects that are shaping the perception(s) of the emerging state in Tunisia today. These aspects relate to: a) the connection of the mosque to the state; b) the educational initiatives that have taken place in the country, although officially unauthorized; c) the engagement of salafi groups in providing civil protection to people; d) the common prayers in public spaces in some particular occasions, and finally, e) the funeral ceremony of Chokri Belaid, the political opponent. The final remarks propose some critical reflections on the multi-layered vision of the state-in-construction in Tunisia today, the rites that attempt to shape its raison d'être, and the counter-voices that reveal a societal project rather embedded in a modern perspective.

Moncef Ben Abdeljelil is currently Professor of classical islamic thought and Dean of the Faculty of Letters and Human Sciences, University of Sousse, Tunisia. He has been appointed from 1992 to 2000 Advisor to the Ministry of Education and Sciences with the task to reform islamic studies at primary and secondary schools, and at al-Zaytuna University, Tunisia. Moncef Ben ABDELJELIL has joined, from 2003 to 2009, AKU's Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilisations, based in London, in the capacity of Head of Educational Programmes.

His areas of research include early shi'ism, history of Muslim marginal sects and minorities, emergence of legal and theological schools in medieval Muslim history, contemporary Muslim thought with focus on Muslim responses to Modernity, Women status in the Arab world and educational reforms. His main publications

include *Re-thinking early sources of Muslim thought* (1988), *Muhammad Bayram V* (1989), *The marginal sect in Islam, 1998,* critical edition of Kitab al-Sirat attributed to al-Mufaddal al-Ju'fî (1998), *Empowering Women in Muslim Societies* (2009); *Reflections on the Critical Methods in the Study of the Qur'an in Contemporary Arab Scholarship* (forthcoming), and *Die Moderne aus der Perspektive muslimischer Kulturen Denken* (2012).

Professor Gerard Wiegers (University of Amsterdam): 'Ottoman politics vis-à-vis Europe and the migration of Moriscos from Spain to Tunis.'

This paper will discuss the complex politics of the Ottoman rulers vis-à-vis the Muslim minorities in Christian Spain. The Muslim minorities who converted under duress between 1499 and 1526 were expelled from Spain between 1609 and 1614, four hundred years ago. In the years following the official order about 300.000 persons migrated to various parts of the Muslim world, in particular Morocco and Tunis. On the basis of hitherto unexplored sources the paper seeks to put Ottoman politics vis-à-vis these minorities in the context of their politics with regard to a number of States in Europe. It seeks to demonstrate which political factors determined the interest which the Ottomans evinced in these Muslim minorities from the Middle Ages onwards and argues that these minorities themselves used their political and judicial networks to achieve favorable conditions of settlement in Tunis and elsewhere.

Gerard Wiegers (Ph.D., cum laude, Leiden University 1991), was Research Fellow of the Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences(KNAW) at Leiden University between 1992 and 1997, Associate Professor of Islamic Studies and Comparative Religious Studies at Leiden University until 2003 and between January 2004 and September 2009 full professor of Comparative Religion and Islamic Studies at

Radboud University Nijmegen. Since September 2009 he has been full professor of Religious Studies at the University of Amsterdam and chair of the department for Religious Studies. He was visiting professor at the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas in Madrid in 1997. He is a member of the editorial boards of among others the Numen Book Series (Brill, Leiden), New Religious Identities in the Western World (Peeters, Louvain), and the Medieval and Early Modern Iberian World (Brill, Leiden) and the journal Al-Qantara (CSIC-Madrid).

He has published widely on the relations between Islam and other religions, Islamic Ethics and Religious Thought, Religion, in particular Islam and Judaism in the Western World, in particular the Iberian Peninsula and North Africa, Ritual Studies and Problems of Method and Theory in the study of religion.

Presentations of participants in the workshops

Workshop 1	**Intellectual Debates**
Chair	**Professor Gabriel Martinez-Gros (IISMM)**

Pieter Coppens (NISIS/Utrecht University): 'Tafsīr as a source for history: the case of Shams al-Dīn al-Daylamī.'

Shams al-Dīn al-Daylamī (d. 593/1197?) is a figure who, although a productive and prolific author, has gone almost unnoticed in Islamic intellectual history. His works are hardly quoted in the Islamic tradition after him, and he is almost unmentioned in Islamic biographical literature. The result of this is that Islamicists have hardly any biographical data to work with. In this presentation it will be discussed if and how a close reading of his *tafsīr* could help in reconstructing the life and times of the author. Instead of understanding the work through the biography of the author, which is most common, we will try to see if it is possible to understand the life and times of the author through his work. Special attention will be paid to a passage from his *tafsīr* that deals with the permissibility for the Sufi to engage with the worldly authorities.

'Tafsīr comme une source pour l'histoire: le cas de Shams al-Dīn al-Daylamī.'

Shams al-Dīn al-Daylamī (d. 593/1197?) est une figure qui, bienqu'il soit un auteur productif et prolifique, est passé presque inaperçu dans l'histoire intelectuelle islamique. Ses oeuvres sont à peine citées dans la tradition islamique après lui et il est presque pas mentionné dans la littérature bibliographique islamique. Le résultat de ceci est que les islamologues ont peu de données biographiques avec lesquelles ils peuvent travailler. Dans cet exposé il sera discuté si et comment une lecture serrée de son *tafsīr* peut contribuer à réconstruire la vie et l'oeuvre de cet auteur.

Au lieu de comprendre l'oeuvre à travers la biographie de l'auteur, qui est chose courante, on essayerais de voir s'il est possible de comprendre le monde selon Shams al-Dīn al-Daylamī par le biais de son travail. Une attention particulière sera donnée à un passage de son *tafsīr* qui traite de la légitimation pour le Sufi afin d'engager avec les autorités terrestres.

Sami Al-Daghistani (Leiden University): 'Encountering ethics and economy within the Islamic state in the writings of Imam Al Ghazali.'

The paper inquires the interplay of economics and ethics within the realm of Islamic state in relation to the writings of Islamic scholar Imam Al Ghazali (d. 1111). Among other elements for ethical economic conduct the role of the state is of a crucial importance for a just society, as stated by the Imam Al Ghazali, nicknamed "the proof of Islam", who contributed immensely on Islamic theology, philosophy, Sufism and, surprisingly perhaps for some, economics. Last field has been largely neglected, although Al Ghazali dedicated many chapters on "just", "fair", and Shari'a-based economic conduct within (Muslim) society.

Al Ghazali had written on the history of Islamic economics, the role of the state in assuring the just conduct in *Naṣiḥat al mulūk* (*Counsel for Kings*), and on the theory of Islamic ethics mostly in his encyclopedic *Iḥya 'ulūm al dīn* (*Revival of Religious Sciences*). Notions like the role of Islamic law, the meaning of the common good in Islam in relation to the state injunctions, and especially Al Ghazali's view on the benefits of Islamic economics for human being, are related to the research topic.

'A la rencontre de l'éthique et de l'économie au sein de l'Etat islamique dans les écrits de l'Imam Al Ghazali.'

L'article examine l'interaction de l'économie et de l'éthique au sein de l'Etat islamique à la lumière des écrits de l'érudit islamique Al Ghazali (d. 1111). Parmi

d'autres éléments d'une conduite éthique de l'économie, le rôle de l'Etat est d'une importance cruciale pour l'avènement d'une société juste, comme l'indique l'Imam Al Ghazali. Surnommé « la Preuve de l'Islam », il apporta une immense contribution à la théologie islamique, à la philosophie, au Soufisme et, probablement à la surprise de quelques-uns, à l'économie. Ce dernier sujet a été largement négligé, en dépit du fait qu'Al Ghazali ait consacré plusieurs chapitres à la conduite de l'économie de manière « juste », « équitable » et basée sur la Charia, dans une société (islamique).

Al Ghazali a écrit sur l'histoire de l'économie islamique, sur le rôle de l'Etat dans la mise en place d'une conduite juste, dans son *Naṣiḥat al mulūk (Le Conseil des Rois)*, ainsi que sur la théorie de l'éthique Islamique, essentiellement dans son encyclopédique *Iḥya 'ulūm al dīn (La Renaissance des Sciences Religieuses)*. Des notions telles que le rôle du droit musulman, la signification du bien commun en Islam en rapport avec les injonctions de l'Etat et surtout, la vision d'Al Ghazali sur les bienfaits de l'économie islamique sur l'humain, sont liées au présent sujet de recherche.

Fatma Moumni (Université de Tunis - Faculté des sciences humaines et sociales de Tunis): 'Notre sujet est intitulé l'impact de la pensée de David Hume sur la philosophie d'Auguste Comte.'

Premièrement, nous avons deux philosophies anthropologiques qui établissent les fondements d'une vie sociale et d'une théorie morale ancrées dans la nature humaine, dans les désirs et les instincts incontrôlés et qui exigent une régulation par la médiation de la sociabilité et du temps. La question des passions, des penchants et des sentiments se dégage d'une problématique classique celle qui l'intégrait au sein d'un subjectivisme rationaliste, qui soumettait le corps à l'emprise de l'âme.

Deuxièmement, nous constatons que La question des passions et de la morale chez le deux philosophies se dégage de la dualité âme et corps pour être investie

dans une problématique nouvelle : celle de l'hominisation se dégageant du cadre d'une pensée de l'ego cogito ou du sujet pensant comme chez Descartes.

Troisièmement : Ce qui est spécifique à ce deux théories de l'affectivité dans son rapport la morale et à la justice, c'est qu'elles conçoivent la raison comme un simple moyen au service de fins fixées par les passions et que ce deux philosophies accordent un grande importance à la sagesse pratique puisque la philosophie devient chez Comte philosophie de l'agir dans le SPP et chez Hume est une philosophie facile commandée par l'expérience donc empirique. Cette problématique rejoint celle d'Aristote qui est celle d'une pensée prudentielle ou d'une sagesse pratique.

Quatrièmement nous nous trouvons devant deux philosophies de la perfectibilité dans le temps celui-ci conçu sous le mode du progrès chez Comte et de l'histoire chez Hume ; ce qui les rapproche c'est la théorie de l'habitude ou des nouvelles habitudes acquises à travers l'expérience cumulative à travers le temps et avec Comte nous avons une culture artificielle qui va se fixer en instinct selon la loi physiologique de l'habitude de Bichat. Ce qui les différencie c'est que le cours du temps est commandé chez Comte par l'idée d'ordre interne progressif entre trois dimensions : le sentiment, la pensée et l'action et d'ordre externe qui implique la possibilité de la domination de la contingence, donc la prévision.

Le point de vue de Hume par contre laisse place à l'intervention, de l'inattendu et de l'événementiel et de la contingence.

Munir Ikhwan (Free University of Berlin): 'Rethinking the Qur'an in an Era of Nation-states: Quraish Shihab's Vision on the Differentiation of Religious and "Secular" Spheres.'

The majority of Muslims have accepted a modern concept of nation-state as either a fact of history or a natural development of political system, despite the perceived theoretical "incompatibility" between Islam and nation-state. Believing Islam as a "total way of life", Muslims disagree on the extent they have to struggle for the

emancipation of religion in state, and on what institutional structures might best realize their ideals. This presentation begins with a discussion on the emancipation of religion in contemporary Indonesia's public space. Special attention is given to Muhammad Quraish Shihab, whose growing prominence has been attracting the attention of Indonesian public since the 1990s through his exegesis and *fatwa* works, and his TV show of *Tafsīr al-Misbāh*. Though educated at the *ulamatic* institution of al-Azhar in Cairo, Shihab is able to present relatively dynamic interpretation of the Qur'an based on his creative reproduction of intellectual traditions in Islam. His approach to the Qur'an is conventional, but the results are very often not. In addressing religion and state, he bases his argument on the differentiation of what religion gives direct guidance and what belongs to the "*shūrā*" (deliberative consensus) domain of people, in which religion only sets up general principles and moral considerations.

Workshop 2	**Religious and Secular Elites**
Chair	**Dr Jan Jaap de Ruiter (NISIS/Tilburg University)**

Mahmood Kooria (Leiden University): 'Intertwined Dar al Harb and Dar al Islam: Ulamas of Aceh and Ponnani and their Political Attachments with West-Asian Sultanates.'

The Early Modern period in the Indian Ocean world witnessed tremendous transferences in political, social, economic, and religious realms. By the arrival of European powers in the Asian maritime world, the existing norms and traditions had to encounter the shifting tendencies in different levels. The Muslim scholars spread across the Indian Ocean rim during the Arab mercantile dominance had the 'moral responsibility', as they thought, of addressing such predicaments. In sixteenth and seventeenth century, thus we see a significant imperativeness from their side to protect the religious and political sovereignty of their Abode of Islam (Dar al Islam) or Abode of Safety (Dar al Aman) against the Portuguese expansions. Numerous

texts were written and religious decrees were declared for this purpose. Accordingly, they also tried to contact the sultanates of Ottoman and Mamluk inciting their religious responsibility of protecting Dar al Islam. The sultanates replied positively by sending militaries and human-resources to these distant lands, though they had their own political and economic interests against the Portuguese. In such an outset, the present paper will examine each case from Southeast Asia (Aceh) and South Asia (Ponnani). Aceh was under the reign of Acehnese Sultanate and coming under the definitions of Dar al Islam. In order to encounter the Portuguese interests over the region, the Acehnese scholars sought supports from Ottoman kingdom. In Ponnani, the rulers were Zamorins of Calicut. Though they were Hindus by religion, they always provided much protection to their Muslim subjects – making Ponnani a region up to the categorical definitions of Dar al Aman. Nonetheless Zamorins' power was deteriorated through constant struggles with the Portuguese. During these struggles lasted almost two centuries, Ponnani acted as a military capital or secondary capital of Zamorins in which the admirals named Kunjali Marakkars were dwelled. During the battles with the Portuguese, the admirals Kunjali Marakkars were remarkably attached with ulama of Ponnani who gave much support to Zamorins inciting the Muslims against the Portuguese, declaring religious decrees (fatwas) against them, and authoring treatises in which they sought support from other Muslim kingdoms.

Imanol Ortega Expósito (Granada University (Spain)/EursianHub): 'The Turkish–Islamic synthesis: The political project of AKP and Kemalist (secular and nationalist) elites.'

The military coup of 1980[1] and the subsequent establishment of the Constitution of 1984 in Turkey ushered in the era considered "Özal decade" (1983-1993). Period

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[1] This pronouncement was justified for a possible "radicalization" of political Islam after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Cfr. Unan Gundogan. "Islamist Iran and Turkey, 1979-1989: State pragmatism and ideological influences". En MERIA, 7, 1, (2003). http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2003/issue1/jv7n1a1.html.

that was conjugated sociopolitical and economic liberalism[2] with a reading of Islamic modernity,[3] so that Islam joined the Turkish nationalism. The military coup found the ingredients in it, both political and cultural, of marriage between Islam and *Kemalist*[4] ideology attempt creating a new Turkish-Muslim identity synthesis (the pioneers in this practice were Ibrahim Kafesoğlu, in the Islamic context, and Alparslan Türkeş in the nationalist field), that following the said coup, which occurred on September 12, 1980 has been one of the official Turkish Islam references, an Islam of "patriots" button against religious radicalism. One might add, following the postulates of Hakan Yavuz, which within the political project of *Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi* (AKP) (Party of Justice and Development) is set to end any ideological project reminiscent of *Kemalist*, which would not be anything but the military guarantor of the secular Republic.[5]

For the current Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, if Necmettin Erbakan represents the tradition in ideological Islamic court,[6] the "evolution" of the AKP's political project is in the tradition of Turgut Özal (to which could be added among others, Adnan Menderes, victim of another military coup in 1960), who pioneered the harmonizing tradition and modernity pushing the limits of religious freedom imposed by secularism. To conclude, the main objective of this paper is showing the relationships network of the various identities given in Turkey and as developed through curious synthesis that have been in conflict since the time of the Seljuks and Turkomans (it is mean the conservative and Sufism rural zones and modern and secular cities).

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[2] Cfr. Serif Mardin. *Religion, society, and modernity in Turkey*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2003.

[3] A. Rashid Moten. *Political science: an Islamic perspective.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 138-141.

[4] In general, we can say that ideology (*Kemalist*) official of the Republic of Turkey was based on six major principles known as the "six arrows" (*Altı Ok*). These principles are: *Cumhuriyetçi* (republicanism), *Milliyetçi* (nationalism), *Halkçı* (populism), *Devletçi* (statism), *Laik* (secularism) and *Inkılapçi* (reformism or nonviolent revolution. Cfr. Carmen Rodríguez López. *Turquía: la apuesta por Europa*. Madrid: La Catarata, 2007, pp. 64-63.

[5] Cfr. M. Hakan Yavuz. *Islamic political identity in Turkey*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

[6] Undoubtedly, the charismatic figure of the movement / Turkish Islamist associations, and therefore, mentor and principal Tayyip ideological influence is represented by the Erbakan Necmettin (1926-2011) which synthesizes the traditional type Islamist idealism. Scientific occupation devoted to the realization of literary short extension that made apology for criticizing the Prophet and religion, among other things, the Christian character of the Zionist Freemason and Justice Party (AP), in power for that time. The creation in 1969 of the National Order Party (MNP) happened in broad terms as a logical consequence of the historical constant that is repeated in Turkey from the sedentary Seljuk and Turkmen nomads: the confrontation between the modern city, republican, secular and Westernized and traditional Sufi field.

Charlotte Courreye (INALCO Paris): 'The Association of Algerian Muslim 'Ulamâ' and the construction of the independent Algerian state: heritage, appropriation and antagonisms (1954-1991).'

I offer to study the Association of the Algerian Muslim 'Ulamâ' after joining up with the National Liberation Front (FLN) in 1956, when it is de facto disintegrating, through the attitudes of its members towards the FLN and towards the independent state.

Some of the Association's members held positions in the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Education. I will make an attempt to understand to what extent the independent state tried to legitimate its power by the appropriation of the 'Ulamâ' 's heritage while implementing socialist policies. Others are completely opposed to the socialist state from the very beginning. They fell within a dissenting Islam, radically opposed to the independent Algerian state.

I want to build a social history of the Association and its members in the newly independent state through individual paths and interpersonal relationships. My sources will be the French archives for the colonial period, the Algerian archives if accessible, the Association's journals and those of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, private archives if possible and oral accounts or memoirs, by means of a long term fieldwork.

Pierre France (Université Paris 1 – Panthéon Sorbonne): 'Lebanese elites during the civil war and legal legitimacy in Lebanon.'

This Paper is based on an ongoing Ph.D Research concerning the Lebanese Parliament during the civil war of 1975-1990. This research is primarily focused on political figures of the contemporary Lebanese history, and their role during these fifteen years of crisis. Studying these MPs provides some interesting facts about elites in the Arab world, and furthermore about the subject of this Spring School, the State in the Arab World. First, these particular elites of the 1972 election are not

only strong leaders involved in patron-clients relationships. They are also known, at that time, to be modernist, young and often highly-educated leaders : hence, they embodied a kind of double-faced State, with both traditional patterns of power and modernist projects and forms. The particular length of their term as MPs, twenty years, offers several cases to observe and long-running view on the balance they made between these two forms of legitimacy. It also makes it possible to observe the replacement of this generation by a new one, who came from civil war and global regional upheavals. Then, this research also deals with the question of legal legitimacy. The contemporary networks and history that connect Lebanese and French «law fields», and beyond this particular country the global French-speaking law networks and institutions, are a subject which never benefit of an in-depth analysis. The use of these networks and institutions seems central in the course for legitimacy, as the historical models of state-making in Europe suggest, but of poor importance in the case of the Arab State. Yet, some parts of my own research suggest that these networks and this legal legitimacy would be useful to study, in the case of Lebanon but especially at a broader regional scale.

'Les élites libanaises pendant la guerre civile, et la question du droit au Liban.'

L'objet de ma thèse, les parlementaires libanais élus en 1972, me permet d'aborder la question de l'Etat sous plusieurs angles que j'aborderai donc dans cette communication : en étant à la fois les législateurs de la modernité et les héritiers de grands propriétaires terriens, sont des figures privilégiées de l'ambivalence de l'Etat dans le monde Arabe, avec un double pouvoir d'une part local, traditionnel et d'autre part national, européanisé, se voulant moderne dans ses projets et dans ses formes. La longueur de la période étudiée dans ma thèse, les années 70 à 90, me permet notamment de voir les fluctuations entre ces deux légitimités, l'usage tactique qu'en font ces hommes politiques suivant les situations, ainsi que le

changement de génération des élites de l'indépendance à des élites de la guerre civile, de la finance et de l'islamisme.

D'autre part, ma thèse m'amène à réfléchir sur le réseau que forment les avocats et les professionnels du droit libanais avec leurs homologues français. La «jurisfrancité», aujourd'hui probablement en déclin, a été peu analysée au Liban, tout comme dans le reste du monde arabe, souvent résumée en tant qu'importation, elle serait probablement intéressante à analyser dans le cadre de cette semaine d'études. Elle permettrait probablement de réfléchir aux réseaux transnationaux et (post-)coloniaux, et à ce qui s'échange ainsi avec le droit et au delà du droit, pour esquisser une socio-histoire de l'Etat, du lien entre politique et droit, et de la formation des personnels.

Workshop 3	Political and Religious Change
Chair	Professor Pierre-Noël Denieuil (IRMC)

Anna Grasso (CHERPA): 'The evolution in the relationship between State and religion in postrevolutionary Tunisia one year after the elections of the Constituent Assembly.'

The objective of this paper is to analyse in which ways the place of religion in Tunisia has impacted the new political landscape since the revolution of January 2011. This paper will develop in three parts. In the first part we shall present the results of a previous qualitative research on the place of religion in post-revolutionary Tunisia. This research was carried out between May 2011 and October 2011, periodknown as the "transition phase" in Tunisia. Secondly, we shall present the main events tied to the question of the relationship between State and religion in Tunisia, which occurred since the elections of the Constituent Assembly on the 23rd of October 2011. These deal mainly with (1) the numerous incidents caused by the rise of radical militants close to the Salafi movement and (2) the debate surrounding

the question of the liberty of the media (a series of episodes came about in which different medias were sued and accused of "violating moral values"). Finally we shall try to observe how this new political dynamic affects the drafting of the new Constitution. We will firstly point out the main problems concerning the relationship between State and religion in the old Constitution and then observe the religion-tied issues that have come up in the drafting of the new Fundamental law. Tunisia seems a particularly pertinent environment to carry out a study on the delicate equilibrium that needs to be found between the main religious phenomenon (Islam) and the secular State administration. Tunisia is often defined as model of a secular State in the Muslim context, an excessively modern State. This is the case especially because, following its independence, this country experienced a period of forceful secularism under the influence of Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia's first president.

'L'évolution de la relation entre État et religion dans la Tunisie postrévolutionnaire un an après les élections de l'Assemblée Constituante.'
Le but de ce travail est d'analyser dans quelle manière la place de la religion en Tunisie a eu un impact sur le nouveau paysage politique depuis la révolution de Janvier 2011. Cette recherche se développera en trois parties. Dans un premier temps nous présenterons les résultats d'une précédente étude qualitative sur la place de la religion dans la Tunisie de l'après révolution. Cet étude a été menée entre mai et octobre 2011, période dite de « transition » en Tunisie. Dans un deuxième temps nous présenterons les principaux épisodes liés à la question de la place de la religion en Tunisie, qui ont eu lieu depuis les élections de l'Assemblée Constituante du 23 Octobre 2011. Ces événements concernent principalement (1) une série d'incidents causés par des militants radicaux proches de la mouvance salafiste qui semblent monter en puissance depuis la révolution, (2) les débats liés à la question de la liberté des médias (une série d'épisodes dans lesquels différentes sources de médias ont été condamnés à payer des amandes et accusés d' « atteinte au sacré »). Enfin

nous analyserons comment cette nouvelle dynamique politique affecte la rédaction de la nouvelle Constitution. Nous observerons les débats qui existent actuellement au tour du processus (encore en cours) de la rédaction de la nouvelle loi Fondamentale. La Tunisie nous semble être un environnement particulièrement pertinent pour mener cette analyse du délicat équilibre à trouver entre fait religieux majoritaire (l'islam) et la gestion étatique séculière. La Tunisie a souvent été présentée comme un modèle d'Etat séculier dans le contexte musulman, un Etat d'une modernité affichée. Ceci est le cas surtout à cause du fait que, au lendemain de son indépendance, ce pays connut une période de sécularisation volontariste sous l'impulsion de Habib Bourguiba, premier président Tunisien.

Alexis Blouet (Université Paris 1 – Panthéon Sorbonne): 'Egypt towards a civil state?'

Since the fall of Mubarak, the concept of "civil state '' ('al-dawla al-madaniyya") has emerged in the Egyptian public space. Barely theorized in the academic field and used only in the Arab world it appears as an original type of state. The term is used almost by the whole of the Egyptian political spectrum, and has represented a point of convergence for actors despite the political polarization that has accompanied the constitutional process. The notion of '' civil state '' seems designed for transcending the dichotomy between secular and Islamic state. Indeed, the features of the Egyptian state such as drawn by the new constitution, the beginning of constitutional practice and ideas of different actors seem to fall within any of the two models. However, one should question the meaning of '' civil state '' at once in etymological, substantive and discursive terms, its success in the political and public sphere, and its limits.

'L'Egypte vers un état civil?'

Depuis la chute de Moubarak, la notion d'état civil ("al-dawla al-madaniyya") a émergé dans l'espace publique égyptien. Peu théorisé par le champ académique et utilisé seulement dans le monde arabe, il apparait comme un type d'état inédit. Le terme est employé presque par l'ensemble du spectre politique égyptien, et a représenté un point de convergence pour les acteurs en dépit de la polarisation politique qui a accompagné le processus constitutionnel. La notion d'état civil semble destinée à transcender la dichotomie entre état séculier et islamique. En effet, les contours de l'état égyptien tels que dessinés par la nouvelle constitution, le commencement de pratique constitutionnelle, et les idées des différents acteurs paraissent s'inscrire dans aucun des deux modèles. Toutefois, il convient de s'interroger sur le sens d'état civil à la fois étymologique, substantif et dans le discours des acteurs, son succès dans la sphère politico-publique, et ses limites.

Saida Ounissi (Université Paris 1 –Panthéon Sorbonne): 'Entre mise en œuvre des politiques sociales et violence légitime, comment assurer la continuité de l'Etat en Tunisie?'

Long regarded as a model of success throughout the Arab world, Tunisia was illustrated by the difference between a smooth image of an in-development country and the fragility of a political system worsened by the exercise of an authoritarian power. After the historical collapse of the political system, on January 14, 2011, it is interesting to consider how the state has continued to operate, despite the upheaval. To understand these mechanisms, it is necessary to run an in-depth analysis of the methods used for the implementation of social policies in the field of social security, family planning and housing policy in Tunisia.

This presentation focuses on the question of the evolution of the legitimacy of the state in Tunisia in the eyes of a post-revolution electorate when they consider the implementation of social policies. First, I will look at the involvement of civil

society in decision-making in relation to the production of public policies. Secondly, I will show how essential the legitimacy of symbolic violence is in a modern state in construction. The central approach is to understand the bases of the organization of the state and the society by analyzing the process of implementing social security schemes, but also of family policies and housing policies. Finally, I will argue that the social action of the state, especially, through the role of public agents is the matrix which ensures the policing in Tunisian society.

Longtemps regardé comme un modèle de réussite au sein du monde arabe, la Tunisie c'est surtout illustrée par la dichotomie qui existe son image lisse de pays en développement sans problème et la réalité d'un système politique fragilisé par l'exercice autoritaire du pouvoir. Après la chute historique du régime de Ben Ali, le 14 Janvier 2011, il est intéressant de voir de quelle manière l'Etat a poursuivi son action et comme s'est opéré la continuité malgré le soulèvement populaire et le vide « politique » qui lui a brièvement succédé. Pour comprendre ces mécanismes, il est nécessaire de s'atteler à une analyse de la mise en œuvre des politiques sociales dans le domaine de la sécurité sociale, du planning familial et du logement social en Tunisie.

Cette présentation vise à mesurer l'évolution de la légitimité de l'Etat au regard de l'accès des citoyens à l'assistance sociale publique. Premièrement, il s'agit de montrer comment s'organise l'implication de la société civile dans la prise de décision dans le domaine des politiques sociales. Dans un second temps, nous verrons le rapport qui existe entre l'imposition de la légitimité de l'Etat et la violence symbolique. L'approche centrale est de comprendre les bases de l'organisation de l'État et la société, en analysant le processus de mise en œuvre du système de sécurité sociale, mais aussi des politiques familiales et des politiques de logement social. Enfin, nous verrons en quoi l'action sociale de l'État, en particulier,

à travers le rôle des agents publics est la matrice qui assure la police dans la société tunisienne.

Mushlihin Amali (Leiden University) : 'Negotiating National Citizenship: State's Educational Responses to Islamist Schools In Post-Authoritarian Indonesia.'

This paper examines the state-Islamist relationship in education after Suharto's authoritarian Indonesia. Education, which has been widely ignored in the debates of political Islam, seems to increasingly emerge as a main battlefield of negotiations. Current development shows that there have been proliferating some hundreds of Islamist educational institutions, ranging from *pesantren* to the so-called 'integrated Islamic schools,' which to some extent had apparently bothered Muslim moderates, and few of which had even overtly challenged both form and base of the state. Apart from Islamic predication, education for Islamists is believed to be as an effective tool to have broader and more bounded supporters for the struggle of the implementation of *shari'a*, or even of the establishment of Islamic state. This view is particularly true when they see no possible opportunity within the current political structure to impose *shari'a* from above, and look at the fact of fruitless radical paths which evidently have no place in the hearts of the majority of Indonesian Muslim community.

Looking at the efflorescence of the Islamist schools and the potential challenges they posed, some measures had been taken by the state, attempting to manage and direct the schools in line with the ideals of national and democratic citizenship. Focusing on the state's educational policies and practices, the investigation of state-Islamist educational relationship is conducted at two levels, national and regional. At national level, the exploration of general policies and practical strategies of both Ministry of Education and Culture and Ministry of Religious Affairs is thoroughly carried out. At regional level, three regions of

Karangayar, Garut and Bogor are selected. Through three different cases - Islamist schools' denial of Mondays flag ceremony in Karangayar, the insertion of Islamist values to state's schools in Garut, and an Islamist school in Bogor near Jakarta which eventually became secular - this paper demonstrates three models of relationship in which ones can observe state's management of Islamist schools in Karangayar, Islamist regulation of state's schools in Garut, and in Bogor parent's demand and market consideration are more influential than state's policies and strategies.

Workshop 4	**Politics of Law and Justice**
Chair	**Dr Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron (IISMM)**

Samer Ghamroun (Ecole normale supérieure de Cachan): 'Scrutinizing the weak state: juvenile justice, sharia courts and legal mobilizations in Lebanon.'
This research questions the scientific and ontological postulate about the Lebanese state's eternal weakness, from which its policy practical impotence is often deduced. It does so by conducting an empirical investigation (session observation, interviews, decision analysis) in and around the new state juvenile courts in Lebanon. Since 2002, these secular courts can protect children in danger, an issue traditionally managed by religious family courts. The judicial activism pertaining to this new protective mission engendered undocumented tensions between secular and religious judges. Up to now, these interactions had virtually no place within the over-ambitious and totalizing theories of strong and weak states applied to Lebanon. My research shows that the daily professional activity of the new juvenile judges takes place "in the shadow" of religious normativity activated by public controversies surrounding some of the judges' decisions seen as aggressive towards sharia courts. However, this developing judicial competition produces effects in both directions. Several women groups will take advantage of the new normative standards and uncertainties introduced by the juvenile judges to push for substantial modifications

of religious law. I investigate one of these groups' successful mobilization in the Muslim Sunni community (interviews, press coverage), which took place between 2006 and 2012. The normative pressure that religious courts have to deal with, around children and women issues, does not only produce hostile rejections from religious judicial actors. It also enables the creation of women discussion groups aiming to defend sharia courts by conducting field investigations in the courts, diagnosing their problems and promoting judicial religious reforms in order to protect the courts against secular legal criticism. We are conducting an ethnographic fieldwork with one of these groups in a Beirut Sunni mosque. From juvenile judges' constrained practices to Islamic judicial reformism and through the mediating legal mobilizations between them, there is no place anymore for the simplistic antagonistic vision opposing the state to religious communities, secular law to religious law, and where the development of the first necessarily leads to the retraction of the latter. My work empirically shows several processes of legal hybridization and mutual institutional reinforcements, in a political field where the competition between the state and other social groups (religious communities and their judicial systems) can lead to the over-institutionalization and consolidation of both.

'De quoi un État faible est-il le nom ? Justice des mineurs, juges religieux et mobilisations juridiques autour de la famille libanaise.'

Ce travail prend le contre-pied de la tradition scientifique et populaire consistant à proclamer, au terme d'une investigation à caractère ontologique, la faiblesse théorique de l'État libanais pour ensuite en déduire son impuissance pratique. A partir d'une enquête de terrain (observation d'audiences, analyse d'arrêts, entretiens) sur les nouveaux juges civils des mineurs dans leur mission de protection des enfants « en danger » qui relèvent traditionnellement de la compétence juridique et morale des juges religieux de la famille, nous avons mis en exergue, entre justice

civile et justices religieuses, des tensions et des interactions jusque là non prises en compte par les théories de l'État faible marginalisé par les puissantes communautés religieuses. Le travail quotidien des juges étatiques des enfants se fait ainsi à l'ombre d'une normativité religieuse constamment réactualisée par les controverses autour des décisions de certains magistrats vécues comme portant atteinte à l'autonomie des tribunaux de la charia. Mais cette compétition judiciaire a des effets dans les deux sens, dans la mesure où des groupes de femmes mobilisent les normes nouvelles introduites par le juge des enfants pour revendiquer des modifications du droit religieux de la famille lui-même, mobilisations dont nous avons documenté les développements au sein de la communauté sunnite (entretiens, analyse de presse). Cette pression normative inédite sur les tribunaux religieux ne va pas seulement produire des réactions hostiles de rejet de la part des acteurs judiciaires proches de la sphère religieuse, mais sera à l'origine de la création de groupes de réflexion par des femmes sunnites cherchant à protéger l'existence des tribunaux de la charia mais cette fois en les réformant pour s'adapter aux développements rapides de l'environnement normatif autour de la famille libanaise. Loin de l'image tenace d'un jeu à somme nulle, d'un antagonisme État-communautés religieuses, droit religieux-droit séculier, l'un reculant pour que l'autre avance, ce travail montre empiriquement les possibilités d'hybridation juridique et de renforcements mutuels, institutionnels et cognitifs (legal consciousness). Dans cet univers-là, l'autonomisation des institutions étatiques n'est plus un prérequis pour l'activation des processus d'étatisation, et les épreuves que ces institutions et leurs acteurs imposent aux groupes sociaux concurrents (les communautés religieuses et leurs systèmes judiciaires) peuvent contribuer à renforcer ces derniers. Nous faisons depuis plusieurs mois l'ethnographie de l'un de ces mouvements de réformisme judiciaire religieux et féminin dans une mosquée de Beyrouth.

Matthieu Rey (EHESS, Paris): 'Ending the Rule of Law in Syria and Iraq (1958-1963).'

Between 1954 and 1963, the Iraqi and Syrian parliamentary regimes fell into crisis. Studying the trajectories of the two nations will shed light on how and why the parliamentary systems collapsed and will also offer an insight into the "Ba'thist regime". I intend to demonstrate that the late fifties could be considered as the end of the post-ottoman period. As Philip Khoury noted, the policies of public figures gradually changed during the interwar period, as their base of power broke down and new classes emerged. According to Joshua Landis, governments and politicians in Syria - and also in Iraq - still behaved as zu'ama in the parliamentary system throughout the fifties (Joshua Landis, 1997). Nevertheless newcomers brought new issues into the political arena, shaking up the 'za'im' habitus. Between 1954 and 1963, the liberal and constitutional hegemony, which had been built at the end of the Ottoman Empire and implemented during the Republic and the Monarchy, collapsed and a new hegemony replaced it. Under this new trend, newcomers defended revolutionary and socialist approaches as the answer to internal and external threats. Analyzing these two kinds of threats is essential to understanding how the rule of Law ended at the beginning of the sixties. Coups in Syria and street uprisings in Iraq proved to be more efficient political tools than legal discussion. Newcomers, in particular the Intelligent Services, monopolized the power. Comparing Iraq and Syria allows a general framework of the end of the post-ottoman era to be drawn up, and also enables us to understand the specific nature of the two paths.

'La fin de l'Etat de droit en Syrie et en Irak (1958-1963).'

Entre 1954 et 1963, les régimes parlementaires syriens et irakiens entrent en crise. L'étude de deux trajectoires nationales doit nous permettre de montrer pourquoi et comment les deux systèmes parlementaires disparaissent tout en apportant des éléments de compréhension sur ce que sont les "régimes ba'thistes". Nous tenterons

de démontrer que la fin des années 1950 correspond au terme de la période post-ottomane. Philip Khoury le rappelle : la politique des notables change graduellement au cours de l'entre-deux-guerres, avec l'érosion des sources de pouvoir et la montée en puissance de nouvelles classes. Si l'on suit les conclusions de Joshua Landis, les politiques en Syrie et en Irak continuent d'agir selon l'habitus de la za'ama au cours des années 1950. Néanmoins, les nouveaux entrants en politique portent de nouvelles questions sociales au sein le débat public qui mettent en cause cet ethos politique. Entre 1954 et 1963, l'hégémonie libérale et constitutionnelle forgée à la fin de l'Empire ottoman et expérimentée pendant la République en Syrie et la Monarchie en Irak, laisse place à un nouvel ordre. Dans ce dernier, les nouveaux entrants défendent une approche de type socialiste et révolutionnaire pour répondre au défi interne et externe. Ces deux menaces doivent être analysées pour saisir la manière dont l'Etat de droit disparait au début des années 1960. Le coup d'Etat ou l'insurrection urbaine deviennent des outils plus efficaces pour agir en politique, que la discussion législative. Les nouveaux entrants, principalement les services de renseignement, s'accaparent alors le pouvoir. La comparaison de la Syrie et de l'Irak permet de dessiner un schéma général de la sortie de l'ère post-ottomane et de comprendre la spécificité de deux trajectoires.

Mouna Bouhajja (Université de Tunis - Faculté des sciences juridiques, politiques et sociales de Tunis): 'The state of law in constitutional and administrative jurisprudence /L'Etat de droit dans la jurisprudence constitutionnelle et administrative. '

The concept of state of law has been introduced in the beginning of twentieth century by the Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen. This one established the first definition of the concept. From a formal point of view, the state of law is defined as the state where a hierarchy of legal norms is established and so its power is limited. From a substantive point of view, the state of law is democratic state where citizens's rights

and freedoms are granted. This work proposes a reflection on the implementation of the rule of law in constitutional and administrative jurisprudence. We will focus essentially on the Tunisian case, with some recourse to comparative law.

Through this study, we will:

- Check the extent of the warranty coverage of the rule of law by the above authorities, through the analysis of constitutional and administrative case law and whether it ensured the rule of law in its two aspects: formal and substantial

- evaluate the effectiveness of the jurisprudence in the implementation of the state of law.

- analyze the different judgments of the Constitutional Court, which will be introduced shortly in Tunisia.

- examine the implementation of the Constitutional Court and possibly compare its work with the work of Tunisian Constitutional Council which was established before the revolution. This will allow us to check whether the post-revolutionary Tunisia has succeed in developing of state of law , with the presence of Islamist parties in the Tunisian political landscape.

Sophie Lemiere (Sciences Po Paris): 'Gangsters and Masters: Connivance Militantism and Criminalisation of the State in Contemporary Malaysia. '

In December 20011, Najib Tun Razak, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, attended the annual meeting of certainly the most controversial Malay organization: The Association of Islamic Welfare and Dakwah of Malaysia (or Pertubuhan Kebajikan dan Dakwah Islamiyah SeMalaysia or PEKIDA). In exchange for Pekida's member's political support, Najib promised governmental aid. Opposition leader's reactions in the press were explicit: Najib's move proves his attachment to ethno-fascist organization (sic).

Pekida has emerged in the media a couple of years ago, and is often portrayed as Malay mafia, UMNO militia, ethnonationalist body etc. Pekida alternatively creates fear, suspicion or denial among Malaysian society. Everybody knows about it but nobody knows what exactly Pekida is. The popular myth surrounding Pekida described it as an umbrella for several sub-groups, spread throughout the country with the support of high profile UMNO politicians and businessmen, that are allegedly involved in criminal activities. Until recently Pekida remained out of sight of the authorities, and academia.

This research reveals the mechanisms of influence of an unforeseen political force in Malaysia and raises the question of the criminalization of the state by exploring a new form of political engagement: the militantism of connivance.

'Gangsters et Maîtres : Militantisme de connivence en Malaisie contemporaine.' En Décembre 2011, Najib Tun Razak, premier Ministre de Malaisie, est l'invité d'honneur de la conférence annuelle de l'une des organisations malaises les plus controversée : l'association islamique de charité et de prédication de Malaisie (Pertubuhan Kebajikan dan Dakwah Islamiyah SeMalaysia) ou PEKIDA. Au cours de la manifestation, il déclare que le gouvernement aidera financièrement l'organisation en échange du soutien politique de ses membres aux prochaines élections générales (devant se tenir avant juin 2013). Les réactions des chefs de l'opposition se font vivement ressentir, et l'un d'eux déclare à la presse que cet acte est une preuve de l'attachement de Najib à cette organisation ethno-fasciste (sic).

La mention de Pekida dans les médias est récente et l'organisation est souvent décrite comme la milice du parti au pouvoir (l'UMNO), ou encore un organe nationaliste, etc. Pekida inspire de la peur, de la suspicion ou du déni au sein de la société malaisienne. Tout le monde connait Pekida, mais personne ne sait véritablement de quoi il s'agit. La rumeur dépeint Pekida comme un paravent officiel pour un réseau gangstérisé qui entretiendrait des liens étroits avec les

politiciens du parti au pouvoir, et impliqué dans des activités criminelles et politiques. Pekida est jusqu'à maintenant resté en dehors de l'attention des autorités malaisiennes, et du monde académique.

Cette recherche révèle les mécanismes d'influence d'une force politique unique et soulève la question de la criminalisation de l'Etat en explorant le concept d'une nouvelle forme d'engagement politique: le militantisme de connivence.

Workshop 5	**Reform and Colonial Politics**
Chair	**Dr Jan Jaap de Ruiter (NISIS/Tilburg University)**

Maryse Kruithof (NISIS/Erasmus University Rotterdam): 'The Dutch Colonial State and Religious Affairs.'

My PhD-thesis focuses on the developments in six different Christian mission districts during the rise of the Dutch mission on Java in the period 1850 to 1920. The numeric expansion of Christians in Java was unremarkable during this first period of the organized mission. A 1930 census shows that only 0.27 percent of the total population of Java embraced either Protestantism or Catholicism.[7] My research aims to produce a history of the Dutch missionary encounter with local religious communities on Java. It illuminates both the Dutch and the Javanese dimensions of this historical exchange and it analyzes the missionaries' reflections upon this encounter and how that influenced their discourse and proselytizing strategies. A comparison is made between the approach and results of Protestant, Catholic and indigenous evangelists.

The relationship between Christian missionaries and the local Muslim people was staged in the colonial setting, and even though most missionaries may at times have had misgivings about the colonial governance they should nevertheless be understood in the context of cultural imperialism. They were significant actors in

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[7] The population of Java was around forty million people between 1900 and 1930; this means the Christian population consisted of a mere 108.000 people. Rauws et al. (1935).

this process, because they found themselves in an exceptional position, namely on the border between their own, the colonial and the local cultures. I will focus in this paper on the relation between the Dutch colonial state and religious affairs. The policy of the Dutch on religious matters in the Dutch Indies has always been based on the principle of neutrality, with the aim to maintain *Rust en Orde* (tranquillity and order). The attitude of the colonial state towards religion can be best described as a 'hands-off' attitude. The state withheld from an all too direct regulation of Islamic practice in order to maintain *Rust en Orde*. However, with the appointment of Christiaan Snouck Hugronje the colonial state's policy in matters of religion became more developed. The new policy was aimed at restricting the influence of 'fanatical' Muslims and restraining them from entering the political stage and preventing Muslims from adopting 'fanatical' ideas via the pilgrimage and contacts with other Muslims outside the East Indies. Moreover the governing system of indirect rule gave administrational power to the *Priyayi*, the indigenous aristocracy, not to the religious authorities. A decade after the introduction of the Ethical Policy (1901), the focus shifted to protecting indigenous culture and Adat law from Islam. The Dutch believed that protecting the syncretic character of Javanese Islam would simultaneously limit the spread of 'fanaticism'.

The relationship between the colonial state and the missionary societies was rather ambiguous. Missionaries often accused the state of being indifferent and counteracting the mission. With the change to the Ethical Policy, the relation between the state and the missionary societies improved and from then on the state was even described as 'helpful' and 'interested' in missionary writings. The state admired the initiatives of the societies in health care and education, and started to work closer together in these fields. The ties between the state and the mission remained close after that until decolonization.

'L'État Colonial Hollandais et les Affaires Religieuses.'

Ma thèse se concentre sur les développements dans six différents districts de la mission Chrétiennes au cours de la montée de la mission Néerlandaise sur Java dans la période de 1850 à 1920. L'expansion de nombres de Chrétiens de Java n'a rien de remarquable au cours de cette première période de la mission organisée. Un recensement de 1930 montre que seulement 0,27 pour cent de la population totale de Java embrassaient soi le Protestantisme ou le Catholicisme. Ma recherche vise à produire une histoire de la rencontre missionnaire Hollandaise avec des communautés religieuses locales sur Java. Il éclaire à la fois les Hollandais et les dimensions Javanaise de cette échange historique et l'analyse des réflexions des missionnaires sur cette rencontre et comment cela a influencé leur discours et les stratégies de prosélytisme. Une comparaison est faite entre l'approche et les résultats des Protestants, Catholiques et évangélistes indigènes.

La relation entre les missionnaires chrétiens et les populations locales Musulmanes a été organisée dans le cadre colonial, et même si la plupart des missionnaires peuvent parfois avoir des doutes au sujet de la gouvernance coloniale, il devrait néanmoins être comprise dans le contexte de l'impérialisme culturel. Ils ont été des acteurs importants dans ce processus, car ils se trouvaient dans une situation exceptionnelle, à savoir, à la frontière entre leurs propres, l'administration coloniale et les cultures locales. Je vais me concentrer dans cet article sur la relation entre les affaires Néerlandaise de l'état et les affaires religieuses coloniales. La politique des Hollandais sur les questions religieuses dans les Indes Néerlandaises a toujours été fondée sur le principe de la neutralité, dans le but de maintenir *Rust en Orde* (tranquillité et ordre). L'attitude de l'État colonial envers la religion peut être mieux décrite comme une attitude de 'laissez-faire'. L'état se retenait d'une réglementation trop directe de la pratique Islamique afin de maintenir *Rust en Orde*. Cependant, avec la nomination de Christiaan Snouck Hugronje, la politique de l'État colonial en matière de religion est devenue plus développée. La nouvelle politique visait à

limiter l'influence des Musulmans 'fanatiques' en leurs interdisant d'entrer dans la scène politique et à prévenir les musulmans d'adopter des idées 'fanatiques' pendant le pèlerinage et à travers des contactes avec d'autres musulmans en dehors des Indes Orientales. Par ailleurs, le système de gouvernement de *la gouvernance indirecte* a donné la puissance à la *Priyayi*, l'aristocratie indigène, et non pas aux autorités religieuses. Une décennie après l'adoption de la Politique d'éthique (1901), l'attention s'est tournée plutôt vers à la protection de la culture autochtone et le droit Adat de l'influence de l'Islam. Les Néerlandais ont estimé que la protection du caractère syncrétique de l'Islam Javanais permettrait à la fois de limiter la propagation du 'fanatisme'.

La relation entre l'État colonial et les sociétés missionnaires était plutôt ambiguë. Les missionnaires accusaient souvent l'Etat d'être indifférent et de contrarier la mission. Avec la modification de la politique éthique, la relation entre l'État et les sociétés missionnaires s'est améliorée et à partir de là, l'état a même été décrit comme 'utile' et 'intéressé' dans les écrits des missionnaires. L'état admirait les initiatives de ces sociétés en matière de soins, de santé et de l'éducation, et a commencé à collaborer plus étroitement dans ces domaines. Les liens entre l'Etat et la mission sont restés proches après cela et jusqu'à la décolonisation.

Simon Najm (EHESS, Paris): 'The challenges of Military Conscription and Badal al askariye after the Tanzimat on the Rum Orthodox Community of Syria (1839-1920).'

The effect of military conscription and Badal al askariye after the Tanzimat: challenges and difficulties faced by the Rum orthodox community of Syria and Lebanon according to the archives of the Rum orthodox patriarchate in Damascus 1839 - 1920.

When the Ottoman Empire was facing serious challenges in the first quarter of the 19th century, the government has promulgated a set of reforms or tanzimat

between 1839 and 1881 to follow the rhythm of progress and evolution of the great powers in Europe. These reforms were not welcomed by the Muslims for they have promoted the other subjects to their level. All non-Muslim subjects became equal to Muslims, they were no longer considered residents of second class, ahl dhimma, and they could serve in the army and acquire decent diplomatic and administrative positions…

With this change the Christians saw the amelioration of their situation, they became equal to Muslims and they were exempted of paying al geziya but they were supposed to serve in the army. The documents located in the patriarchate highlight several difficulties for the Christian military conscription for it was decided that a tax should be paid to exempt them from the military service. The military contribution, badal al askariye, was a new form of geziya and the documents show that the amount was superior to the former one.

Eventually the badal al askariye generated various challenges for the rum orthodox patriarchate and its community. What were those challenges? And how did the military conscription contaminate the relation between the Rum orthodox and the Porte? Between the Rum orthodox and their patriarchate?

'L'effet de la conscription militaire et Badal al askariye après le Tanzimat: défis et difficultés rencontrés par la communauté Rum orthodoxe de Syrie et du Liban par rapport aux archives du patriarcat Rum orthodoxe de 1839 à 1920.'

Lorsque l'Empire ottoman était confronté à de sérieux défis dans le premier quart du 19e siècle, le gouvernement a promulgué une série de réformes ou Tanzimat entre 1839 et 1881 pour suivre le rythme de progrès et l'évolution des grandes puissances en Europe. Ces réformes n'ont pas été bien accueillies par les musulmans car les autres sujets ont été promus à leur niveau. Tous les sujets non musulmans sont devenus égaux aux musulmans, ils ne sont plus considérés des résidents de seconde classe, ahl dhimma, et ils pourraient servir dans l'armée et d'avoir des positions

diplomatiques et administratives ... Avec ce changement, les chrétiens ont vu l'amélioration de leur situation, ils sont devenus égaux aux musulmans et ils ont été exemptés de payer al geziya mais ils étaient censés servir dans l'armée. Les documents qui se trouvent dans le patriarchat et les diocèses mettent en évidence plusieurs difficultés pour la conscription militaire des chrétiens, il a été décidé qu'une taxe doit être payée pour les exempter du service militaire. La contribution militaire, badal al askariye, était une nouvelle forme de geziya et les documents montrent que le montant était supérieur à l'ancien. Finalement, le badal al askariye a soulevé de divers défis pour la communauté Rum orthodoxe et leur patriarchat. Quels sont ces défis? Et comment la conscription militaire a contaminé la relation entre les orthodoxes Rum et la Porte? Entre les orthodoxes Rum et leur patriarcat? Les défis soulevé par la conscription militaire et Badal al askariye après le Tanzimat à la communauté Rum orthodoxe de Syrie 1839 – 1920.

Nessim Znaien (Université Paris 1-Panthéon Sorbonne): 'Government and the control of Alcohol trade in Tunisia during colonization (1881-1956).'
Within my Phd analysis, I try to show the link between men and alcohol, when French colonized Tunisia between 1881 and 1956. During this period, the Tunisian government was affected by an important change. Wine production is quickly organized by the government. At first, it was to answer a need comes from France, which experiences at that time the consequences of phylloxeria. The government writes bills to accompany the colonial society. During this period, this society increasingly considers that high quality production was quintessential to its identity. To open a shop where people can find alcohol, it is mandatory to send a specific request to the governor of the considered region. The governor sets up an inquiry and then decides to authorize or not such a shop. Each member of the administration plays a part and the alcohol trade is a mean to analyse the daily machinery of the state. In this respect, cafés are places to meet and talk and therefore become strategic

places for the government to build its legitimacy. At last, despite real economical interests, the consummation of wine is highly regulated by the government. For example, quickly the decision was made to forbid alcohol sales to Muslims. Even if this policy was difficult to apply, it axes created to control the public area to build an alliance with Muslim authorities and to set up an orientalist dimension within the colonies.

'L'Etat et le contrôle du commerce de l'alcool en Tunisie sous le protectorat (1881-1956).'

Notre thèse tente d'étudier le rapport des hommes au yin et plus généralement a l'alcool sous le protectorat français en Tunisie (1881-1956), dans un espace, qui connait, au cours de la période, une mutation importante de l'Etat. La production de yin est rapidement organisée par l'Etat, dans un premier temps pour répondre a une demande de la métropole, affaiblie par le phylloxera. L'Etat définit des mesures juridiques, qui accompagnent le mouvement d'une société de colons, qui considère de plus en plus la production de yin de qualité comme un élément essentiel de son identité. L'ouverture d'un débit de boisson requiert une demande spécifique adressée aux gouverneurs de chaque région, qui ouvrent une enquête de police, et autorisent ou non une licence d'exploitation. Tous les acteurs de l'administration sont donc concernes. L'acte de commercialisation du yin, rend donc compte d'une expérience quotidienne des rouages de l'Etat, et de la tentative du contrôle de celui-ci sur la société. Le café, lieu d'échanges, est un lieu particulièrement sensible au sein de l'espace public, et le contrôle de celui-ci, est un élément primordial pour la construction de la légitimité de l'Etat. Enfin, malgré certains intérêts économiques, la consommation du yin obéit a la tentative d'une règlementation stricte de la part de l'Etat. Ii est très tôt décidé d'interdire toute vente d'alcool a des musulmans. Mesure de contrôle de l'ordre public, cette politique, a l'application aléatoire, marque aussi la

volonté de se concilier les autorités religieuses musulmanes et appliquer une idéologie orientaliste aux colonies.

Workshop 6	Gender and Space
Chair	**Professor Anne Marie Moulin (CNRS/Paris VII/IISMM)**

Annemarie van Geel (NISIS/Radboud University Nijmegen) : 'The Relationship between the State and the Religious Field in the Creation of Women-Only Public Spaces in Saudi Arabia.'

As Yamani (1996), Abu Lughod (1998), Kandiyoti (1991) and Le Renard (2008) argue, the position of women must be analysed in the context of the political projects of contemporary states and of their historical transformations. When doing this regarding Saudi Arabia, the relationship between the state and the religious field in creating women-only public spaces becomes apparent. In the Kingdom, important factors originating and supporting new and stricter forms of public gender segregation were the discovery of oil, the process of urbanisation, and rise of the revivalist Sahwa (awakening) movement and its discourse on segregation. This paper will look particularly at the latter development, showing how the origination, development, and enforcement of the segregation of men and women in the Kingdom is connected to socio-political and economic changes in Saudi society, with specific attention for how the state and the religious establishment are intertwined in the development and practice of gender segregation. It will be shown how, in negotiating the demands of the various factions in society and by facilitating the participation of women in public life separate from men, the Saudi rulers have presented the segregation of the sexes as a sign of modernity and progress.

Comme Yamani (1996), Abu Lughod (1998), Kandiyoti (1991) en Le Renard (2008) soutiennent, la situation des femmes doit être analysée dans le contexte des projets

politiques des Etats contemporaines et des leurs transformations historiques. Au cas de l'Arabie Saoudite cette approche révèle la relation entre l'Etat et le domaine religieux dans le but de créer des espaces publiques réservés aux femmes. Dans le Royaume saoudite, la découverte du pétrole, le processus d'urbanisation et la montée du mouvement Sahwa (réveil) et de son discours en faveur de la ségrégation, tous ont joué un rôle important à l'origine et la préservation des formes nouvelles et plus strictes de ségrégation entre les sexes dans la sphère publique. Cette présentation portera une attention particulière à l'évolution ultérieure en montrant comment la création, le développement et la mise en vigueur de la ségrégation entre les hommes et les femmes du Royaume est connectée aux développements socio-politiques et économiques dans la société saoudienne, avec une attention particulière sur la façon dont l'Etat et l'establishment religieux sont étroitement liés au développement et à la pratique de la ségrégation entre les sexes. Il montrera comment au cours des négociations des revendications des différentes couches sociales et l'encouragement de la participation des femmes dans la vie publique séparées des hommes, les dirigeants saoudiens ont présenté la ségrégation des sexes comme un signe de la modernité et du progrès.

Oussama Boufrikha (Université de Sousse) : 'The protesting spaces and its symbolic systems: anthropological approach to Ibadism in M'zab.'
The aim of this thesis is to search in the protesting areas of the Ibadi community in Wadi Mizab, since it is considered as a human balance revealing the cultural patterns of this community and its forms of presence in the world.

The protest is not linked to the emotional level -as we may think- however, it is a pattern of symbols and representations related to this cultural community. In addition, by cultural community we mean the Ibadi one, which is based on three backgrounds: religious; as a different community, ethnic; as Amazighs and political; as an authoritarian sect.

We have adopted in this thesis the interpretative anthropology as an approach to understanding the cultural path of this community due to its existence in Wadi Mizab, ecologically immune, which allows the development of the elements of the Ibadi speech and the evolution of the constituents of its convergence in that region without denying the surrounding social, political and economic data.

We rely on the combination between the textual and historical study of the Ibadi community and the applied field study through previewing these spaces and how they were invested anthropologically in real life.

Henda Ghribi (Université de Tunis - Faculté des sciences humaines et sociales de Tunis): 'The *niqâb* as a revealing of identity and social mutation.'

The spread of the *niqab*, in a country considered as one of the most modernized Arab Muslim countries evokes once again and with persistence the questions of identity, individual liberty and women status in the post-revolutionary Tunisia. These progressive changes of the Tunisians' clothing practices reveal the social transformations and mutations within this society.

The development of the *Salafi* movement, which aims to establish a society that resembles that of the pious ancestors, in Tunisia, plays a crucial role in the spread of this dress habit. It is due, also, to a phenomenon of imitation that is extending increasingly to the general population. This movement seeks to restore the Tunisian society by challenging the norms and values shared by the entire community and to establish a new model that breaks with the principles of the civil society.

Adopting the *niqab* does not show up as a marker of a different interpretation of religion only, it is also an indicative of a change of mode of being through which the woman draws new barriers with the outside world dominated by men. The *niqab* expresses a desire to access public space without being seen while remaining invisible in their private space. In this sense, the *niqab* becomes a means of liberation of the woman.

This research focuses on the adoption of the *niqab* as a symbolic sign that reflects the process of an identity quest as well as the spread of new standards within the Tunisian society.

Mourad Mhenni (Université de Tunis - Faculté des sciences humaines et sociales de Tunis): 'L'État et la structuration des sociétés locales l'exemple des villages pilotes de la Basse vallée de la Medjerda.'

Il s'agit d'une étude comparative des villages agricoles instaurés par l'État Tunisien dans le cadre de la mise en valeur de la basse vallée de la Medjerda qui a débuté suite à la promulgation de la loi 63/58 relative à cette mise en valeur. Ces villages sont ELHABIBIA (creation 1959), ELMOEZIA(1964) ,la nouvelle UTIQUE (1964).

Cette étude est l'extension de mon Master qui a porté sur le premier village pilote instauré dans ce cadre : le village d'ELHABIBIA qui a porté le prénom du premier président de la république tunisienne HABIB BOURGUIBA (HABIB/HABIBIA).

La problématique centrale de cette étude peut être formulée ainsi : dans quelle mesure l'État pourrait-il orienter l'évolution de la vie sociale dans les sociétés locales qu'il a instaurées?

Cette problématique centrale pourrait être développée suivant deux axes majeurs , d'une partla logique du développement volontariste confrontée aux stratégies des acteurs sociaux locaux, et d'autre part la spécificité de la dynamique sociale relative aux sociétés locales instaurées par l'Etat .

La basse vallée de la Medjerda semble le territoire adéquat à l'expérimentation des hypothèses relatives au développement volontariste. En effet cette région de la Tunisie a été depuis le 17è siècle la cible d'un interventionnisme Étatique condensé qui a débuté par l'implantation d'une population mauresque qui a fui l'Espagne reconquiert, et ensuite par l'intervention massive d'une colonisation agraire établie

par les autorités coloniales françaises à la fin du 19è siècle, et enfin par des projets pilotes volontaristes dirigés par l'Etat tunisien postcolonial.

Workshop 7	**Media**
Chair	**Professor Moncef Ben Abdeljelil (University of Sousse)**

Sunarwoto (NISIS/Tilburg University): 'Finding the State's Legitimacy: Radio Dakwah in the political context.'

In this presentation, I am going to talk about how *radio dakwah* in Surakarta have gained the state's political backup. My starting point is that it is not sufficient for radio stations in Indonesia which broadcast Islamic programmes to be called *radio dakwah* unless they hold the legitimacy of the state. The legitimacy is not only achieved by legal recognition from the state but also through the mobilisation of political and cultural symbols. So, the questions to be explored in this presentation are to what extent and how the members of the *radio dakwah* have mobilised those symbols to achieve the State's legitimation and what impacts the mobilisation can might have on their *dakwah* movements.

In answering these questions, I will focus on three radio stations, including Radio MTA FM, RDS FM and Radio Al-Hidayah FM. I assume that the ways they received the State's legitimacy differ from one to another. The difference reflects their stances toward the State, on one hand, and their different religious points of view regarding the implementation of shari'a in the nation's life on the other. In addition, the difference also represents to what points their *dakwah* activities are directed.

This presentation is based on my research which is still on progress, so that I will not pretend to have a conclusive statement of the subject. I hope I can receive a lot of feedbacks from the audience of this NISIS spring school.

'Trouver la légitimité de l'État: Radio Dakwah dans le contexte politique.'

Dans cette présentation, je vous vais parler comment la radio Dakwah à Surakarta a acquis une sauvegarde politique de l'État. Mon point de départ est que ce n'est pas suffisant pour les stations de radio en Indonésie qui diffusent des programmes islamiques d'être appelé radio Dakwah à moins qu'ils détiennent la légitimité de l'État.. La légitimité n'est pas seulement assurée par la reconnaissance juridique de l'État, mais aussi par la mobilisation des symboles politiques et culturels.

Ainsi, les questions qui seront explorées dans cette présentation sont dans quelle mesure et comment les membres de l'Dakwah radio ont mobilisé ces symboles pour obtenir la légitimation de l'Etat et l'impact que la mobilisation pourrait avoir sur leurs mouvements Dakwah.

Je suppose que la façon dont ils ont reçu la légitimité de l'État diffère de l'un à l'autre. La différence reflète leurs positions à l'égard de l'Etat, d'une part, et de leurs différents points de vue religieux sur l'application de la charia dans la vie de la nation sur l'autre. En outre, la différence représente également sur quels points leurs Dakwah activités sont dirigés.

Cette présentation est basée sur ma recherche, qui est toujours en cours, de sorte que je ne vais pas faire semblant d'avoir une déclaration concluante sur le sujet. J'espère que je peux recevoir beaucoup de rétroactions de l'auditoire de cette NISIS école de printemps.

Raoudha Maghraoui (Université de Tunis) : 'Représentation métaphorique et caricaturale du contexte-socio-politique tunisien à travers une lecture sémiologique du discours publicitaire tunisien : étude de cas.'

La publicité a profité des élections tunisienne du 23 octobre 2011 pour les tourner en dérision à travers une campagne publicitaire visant à élire le meilleur jus de fruits de la marque « Minute Maide Tunisie » en mettant en scène des réunions entre les candidats et leurs partisans et les assemblées politiques des partis comme le parti

des pommes, des poires, des oranges et bien d'autres. Ces réunions sont associées à la violence à la fois verbale et physique. Il est question de menace, d'attentats, et d'affrontements entre les partisans des différents partis. Le langage semble être le révélateur des réalités socio-politiques concernant ces élections en les décrivant grâce au recours à l'ironie, la caricature, et les métaphores. Il atteste du pouvoir de la langue à railler et parodier les élections effectuées sous le régime de Ben Ali, qui bien qu'elles soient des compagnes couteuses financièrement, leurs résultats sont connus d'avance car ils sont falsifiés et truqués. C'est une réalité caractérisant les élections de tous les pays arabes étant une occasion de célébrer la consécration de la dictature de l'autorité en place, et de résister à tout changement démocratique. Ainsi, la publicité visant à convaincre pour vendre devient une arme qui démontre le réel en le critiquant pour témoigner de l'aspiration des peuples à un avenir meilleur basé sur le droit à la différence, et le respect de la liberté.

Ahmad Nuril Huda (NISIS/Leiden University): 'Santri's Film Practices and Political Islam in Contemporary Indonesian Cinema.'

Over the last five years, *santri* Muslims have increasingly participated in the realm of Indonesian cinematic culture. Not only do they attend a commercial cinema theater for film screening, but they also make films about themselves, as well as screen films of their own production and choices in an independent way. In many ways their film practices are not an apolitical expression. In this paper, I will explain the importance of *santri's* film practices at the local and independent level, for opening up a discussion about relations between Islam and politics in the Indonesian contexts. To do so, I will use *santri* as an emblematic figure that is capable of giving insights into current social changes of Indonesian Islam (Barker and Lindquist et al., 2009). In the first part of my paper, I will show briefly the changing political positions of *santri* in contemporary Indonesian cinema. In the second part, I will explain the ways *santri* Muslims reveal their political expressions through film

practices, and describe how these expressions are telling us about current situations of political Islam in the country at large. The material I will present in this paper is mainly based on participant observation and interviews during my fieldwork conducted from the period of January-June 2012 in Jakarta, Jogjakarta, Tasikmalaya and Kediri; all are in Java.

'Les pratiques filmographiques des Santri et l'Islam politique dans le cinéma indonésien contemporain.'

Au cours des cinq dernières années, les musulmans Santri ont de plus en plus participé au domaine de la culture indonésienne cinématographique. Non seulement se rendent-ils à une salle de cinéma commerciale pour la projection des films, mais ils font aussi des films sur eux-mêmes et voire projettent des films de leur propre production et choix de manière indépendante. À bien des égards leurs pratiques cinématographiques ne sont pas une expression apolitique. Dans cet exposé j'expliquerai l'importance des pratiques filmographiques des Santri sur un niveau local et indépendant, afin d'ouvrir une discussion sur les relations entre l'Islam et la politique dans le contexte indonésien. Pour ce faire, je vais utiliser les Santri en tant que figure emblématique capable de fournir des informations sur les changements sociaux actuels de l'Islam indonésien (Barker and Lindquist et al., 2009). Dans la première partie de mon exposé je montrerai brièvement les attitudes politiques en mutation des Santri dans le cinéma indonésien contemporain. Dans la deuxième partie, j'expliquerai les différentes manières dont les musulmans Santri révèlent leur expression politique à travers des pratiques filmographiques. Ensuite j'explorerai ce que ces manières d'expression indiquent concernant la situation actuelle de l'Islam politique dans le pays en général. Le matériel que je présenterai dans cet exposé est principalement basé sur l'observation des participants et les entretiens réalisés pendant mon travail de terrain dans la période janvier-juin 2012 à Jakarta, Jogjakarta, Tasikmalaya et Kediri; toutes ces locations se trouvant sur l'île de Java.

Omar Adam Sayfo (Utrecht University): 'Religious education in Arab Childrens Television and Animated Cartoons.'

The complex and dynamic relation between religion and state is reflected in many domains of social life in the Arab world, including the domain of television, which both government agencies and religious institutions try to use to influence the public. Television plays a major role in children's lives not only in the West, but in the Arab world as well. Children's programmes and cartoons inspire at least as much cultural authority and legitimacy for teaching specific roles, values and ideals as do traditional sites of learning such as public schools, religious institutions and the family. In the Western view, programs designed for child audiences are classified as informative if they are designed to educate, teach a skill, present moral or social messages, and transmit knowledge about history, science and literature. However, in the Arab context, televised religious education is considered inseparable from a wider educative and even entertaining content.

In order to reach out to young audiences, Arab governments, foundations and religious institutions are now airing their own dedicated channels. Channels supported by Islamic institutions such as al-Majd Kid's Channel, Semsem, Toyoor al-Jannah, Hadi TV, Hodhod TV, Taha TV and others regard one of their main missions to present Islamic values to their audience. In the same time government sponsored channels such as the Saudi Ajyal and Jordanian Karamesh TV also carry religious content that concure with the agenda of particular governments. Even channels that claim to be entertaining only, stress Islamic values, by localising global formats - such as Reality Shows - in a sense to fit the taste of Muslim audience. Also there is a proliferation of new hybrid genres such as „Islamic Animations" and other localised genres and formats designed to spread religious messages. The complex relation between state and religious institutions could be best observed at the case of Al Jazeera's Children's Channel (AJCC) the first Pan-

Arab edutainment channel that was launched in 2005 to address an audience between 7 and 15 years old. Besides its educative mission AJCC carries a political and religious agenda similar to those of the main Al Jazeera Channel, namely strengthening Qatar's authority in the inter-Arab political and religious discourse.

The relationship between „State and Religion" in the case of Arab children's television could be described by a complex system of patronage relations, professional networks, institutional links, personal preferences and artistic ambitions. It is an improving platform where governmental and religious actors cooperate, coexist and compete with each other.

'L'enseignement religieux à la télévision et animation arabe pour enfants.'

Dans le monde arabe, la relation complexe et dynamique entre la religion et l'État se reflète dans de nombreux domaines de la vie sociale, y compris le domaine de la télévision ce qui essaye d'utiliser les agences gouvernementales et les groupes religieux pour influencer le public. La télévision joue un rôle majeur non seulement dans la vie des enfants de l'Occident mais ceux du monde arabe aussi. Les programmes pour enfants et les dessins animés inspirent aussi bien l'autorité culturelle et la légitimité pour l'enseignement des rôles spécifiques, les valeurs et les idéaux que les sites traditionnels d'apprentissage tels que des écoles publiques, des institutions religieuses et de la famille. Selon le point de vue occidental, les programmes pour enfants sont classifiés comme informative s'ils sont conçus pour éduquer, enseigner une compétence, présenter des messages moraux ou sociaux ou transmettre des connaissances sur l'histoire, la science et la littérature. Cependant, dans le contexte arabe, l'éducation télévisée de la réligion est considérée comme une affaire inséparable du contenu éducatif (plus large), même distrayant.

Pour atteindre des publics jeunes, les gouvernements arabes, les fondations et les institutions religieuses diffusent maintenant leurs propres chaînes. Les chaînes soutenues par des institutions islamiques, comme par exemple la chaîne al-Majd

Kid's, Semsem, Toyoor al-Jannah, Hadi TV, Hodhod TV, TV Taha et d'autres, considèrent l'une de leurs principales missions de présenter les valeurs islamiques à leur public. Dans le même temps, les chaînes financées par le gouvernement comme Ajyal (saoudienne) et Karamesh TV (jordanienne) ont également un contenu religieux qui est coordonné avec le programme des gouvernements particuliers. Même les chaînes avec des valeurs islamiques en exigeant l'effort distrayant, en localisant des formats globaux, - tels que les émissions de téléréalité - dans un sens pour s'adapter au goût du public musulman. Avec la diffusion des chaînes pour enfants arabes, la demande pour des productions du pays augmente aussi. Cela conduit à la présence de nouveaux genres hybrides comme « Animations islamiques» et d'autres genres localisés et des formats conçus pour diffuser des messages religieux.

L'une des chaînes les plus importantes est la chaîne Al Jazeera's Children's (AJCC), Cette chaîne ludo-éducative était la première chaîne pan-arabe ce qui a été lancée en 2005 à un public de 7 à 15 ans. A côté de sa mission éducative, l'AJCC porte un agenda politique et religieux, similaire à celui de la chaîne principale d'Al Jazeera. En produisant des programmes religieux pour les enfants, le Qatar renforce son autorité dans le discours religieux inter-arabe. Dans le cas de la télévision pour enfants arabes, la relation entre « l'État et la religion » pourrait être décrite par un système complexe des relations de patronage, des réseaux professionnels, des liens institutionnels, des préférances personnelles et des ambitions artistiques. Il y a une plateforme améliorante où les personnages gouvernementals et religieux coexiste, coopère et se fait concurrence.

Workshop 8	Institutions and Policies
Chair	Dr Nico Landman (NISIS/Utrecht University)

Thomas Claes (Free University of Berlin): 'The Role of Religious Institutions in shaping State-Religion Relations in Egypt.'

Working on the relationship of the Islamic religious institution of al-Azhar with the Egyptian state, I encountered that religious institutions and their possibilities to shape religious politics and to influence politics that aim to shape the boundaries of the spheres of religion and politics (commonly coined as secularism) are often overlooked by researchers. Likewise, recent theorists of secularism, such as Talal Asad, but for my case most notably Hussain Agrama, place the state in the position of the single decisive actor in defining these spheres or the "problem-space" of Secularism as introduced by Agrama. While the concept of the "problem-space" is a very useful one, it fails to acknowledge the dynamics of state-religion relations in the Egyptian context. Setting the example of al-Azhar and its relation with the state in historical perspective, a dynamic relationship mirroring power struggles and quarrels over influence becomes evident. This dynamic relationship signals a significant degree of independence of the religious establishment which I suggest should not be overlooked in future analyses of the configuration of secularism in Egypt and possibly other Islamic and postcolonial contexts.

'Le rôle des institutions religieuses dans la formation des relations État-religieux en Égypte.'

En cours de la recherche sur l'institution religieuse islamique d'al-Azhar et sa relation avec l'État Égyptienne, j'ai découvert que les institutions religieuses et leurs possibilités de façonner la politique religieux et leurs influence sur la démarcation des frontières des sphères de la religion et de la politique (un concept généralement forgé "laïcité") sont souvent négligés par les chercheurs. De même, les théoriciens récents de la laïcité tels que Talal Asad, mais pour mon cas principalement Hussain Agrama, placez uniquement l'État dans la position de l'acteur primordiale pour la définition des sphères au du "problem-space" de la laïcité comme introduit par

Agrama. Bien que le concept du "problem-space" est très utile, il a mon avis ne reconnaît pas la dynamique des relations État-religieuses dans le contexte Égyptien. Mettre l'exemple d'al-Azhar et sa relations avec l'État dans une perspective historique une relation dynamique reflétant les luttes de pouvoir et des querelles de l'influence devenir évident. Cette relation dynamique et une indication pour le dégrée signifiante de l'indépendance des autorités religieuses. Je propose que cette indépendance ne doit pas être négligé dans les analyses futures sur la configuration du laïcisme en Égypte et peut-être aussi dans autres contextes islamiques et postcoloniales.

Claudie Fioroni (IHEID, Geneva): 'Politics at Work And Politics for Work in Jordan.'

The starting point of this presentation is the fact that the Jordanian political situation seems paradoxical in light of the most popular political analyses. The Hashemite regime in Jordan has not been yet seriously threatened by popular uprisings, while the socio-economic and political situations in Jordan is not radically different from the one in countries which have been experiencing revolutions since 2011. Secondly, while both political and academic debates on the political stability of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan revolve around the rentier state theory, the Jordanian case rather defies the "buying" argument since the late 1980s. Employment is emblematic of this seeming paradox. Based on the assumption that the Jordanian situation is not paradoxical per se but in light of the theoretical lenses that are used to explain it, this presentation explores new paths for analysing the dynamics of power in the Hashemite Kingdom - in particular between the state, the regime and the Jordanian population - by focusing on employment and labour policies. It builds upon M. Foucault's approach to design an innovative theoretical framework to study the limits of the Jordanian state in terms of government rationality: what is the rationale of ruling practices in Jordan? To what extent do the "state effect", the "capitalist

effect", patronage networks and political Islam influence the rationale of ruling practices? How do the different kinds of ruling practices (that may be contradictory in their goals) work in relation to each other?

'Politique au travail et travail au service du politique en Jordanie.'
Le point de départ de cette présentation est le constat selon lequel la situation politique jordanienne apparait paradoxale, à la lumière de la plus part des théories en usage. Premièrement, depuis 2010 le royaume Hashemite de Jordanie n'a pas été sérieusement menacé par les soulements populaires alors, qu'à première vue, sa situation socio-économique et politique ne diffère pas radicalement de celle des pays ayant connu des révolutions. Deuxièment, alors que les débats politiques et académiques sur la stabilité politique de la Jordanie s'articulent autour de la question de l'Etat rentier, le cas jordanien semble plutôt défié l'argument de l'achat depuis la fin des années 1980s. Or, l'emploi est emblématique de ce paradoxe apparent. Considérant que la situation jordanienne n'est pas paradoxale en elle-même mais par rapport aux lunettes théoriques revêtues pour l'expliquer, cette présentation explore de nouvelles perspectives pour analyser les dynamiques de pouvoir dans le royaume Hashemite - en particulier entre l'Etat, le régime et la population jordanienne - à travers l'étude de l'emploi et des politiques du travail. Elle propose un cadre théorique inspiré des travaux de Michel Foucault pour penser les contours de l'Etat en termes de rationalité de gouvernement: quelle est la rationalité des pratiques de gouvernement en Jordanie ? Dans quelle mesure les rationalités étatiques, capitalistes, du régime et de l'Islam politique influencent-elles les pratiques de gouvernement ? Comment fonctionnent-elles et comment s'articulent-elles les unes aux autres ?

Azza Bchir (Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne/ Télécom Ecole de Management, Paris): 'Boundaries between political sphere and the religion symbolic norms: The use of scenarios methodology.'

One of the method by which we can theorize practices of social actors is the qualitative analysis by using social representations. The construction of social actors' symbolic practices linked with the analyze of the genesis of the extremism and religion norms brings us to analyze structures that social actors mobilize and which naturally contribute to a destruction of the project of territory development in Tunisia. What is the risk of destruction of the modern nation state when we use religion as a structure of sense to construct a legitimacy institution based on religion? Why it's important to keep boundaries between political sphere and the religion symbolic norms? How to make "a social contract "which respects different ideologies. This reality of the interference of religion in political sphere has prompted many anthropologists and sociologists to recognize the relationship between religion, state and norms. As a symbolic system, religion orders the universe, (language, social representations, practices etc.).Objective structures are independent of the consciousness of agents, which are capable of guiding and constraining their practices or their representations. A cognitive card is a scheme or a mental model, a theory, a cognitive structure which guides the individual or the group in his apprehension of phenomenon. A cognitive card can be individual or collective. *Our research hypothesis is that cognitive cards of persons influenced by religion norms are convergent.*

Molka Belhadj (Université de Tunis - Faculté des sciences juridiques, politiques et sociales de Tunis): 'The Executive Privilege of the American President.'

- An overview of the Executive Privilege:

The Executive Privilege is the President's right to withhold certain information from Congress, the courts or agencies. It is also considered as a recent American usage

which was introduced by President G. Washington who refused to provide the Congress with the documents related to the defeat of the General St. Clair against Indians in 1791.

- The conflict of powers between the President and Congress over the scope of the Executive Privilege:

The Presidential Privilege raises such important issues related to the powers given to each branches and their limits. More precisely, the scope of the Executive Privilege, which is claimed by the President, still not clear enough, and could not be really limited.

- Inconsistency of the secrecy and the confidentiality of information with the right to be informed:

Generally, the public and the other branches of government have the right to get information on the President and the executive branch's actions. As a result of the use of the executive privilege to hide facts or documents, the secrecy of information would prevail.

- The Executive Privilege could not be an absolute power:

The President's unlimited power could lead to unchecked presidential power, when he acts without the consent of the other branches. As a matter of fact, an ultimate Executive Privilege could not operate under the principle of separation of powers.

Workshop 9	**Diversity, Minorities and Tensions**
Chair	**Professor Gerard Wiegers (NISIS/University of Amsterdam)**

Racha Ben Abdeljelil Gamha (Université de Tunis & Université de Lyon): 'The governing of San'a' by the Zaydi dynasty.'

The Zaydism is a Shi'ite dogma founded in al-Yaman by Hâdī ibn al-Ḥusayn Yaḥyā; a politico-religious dogma that has never exceeded the highlands. The city of Ṣan'ā' experienced a lot of conflict between the supporters of religion (imām) and the state

represented by a hierarchical urban scheme that doesn't have a tangible textual legal basis. The head of the state is the Chief- Šayḫ who must have a status of Sayyid (descendant of 'Alī and Fāṭima).

The city has managed at some period of time to establish a state power held by leaders outside the Zaydi doctrine and based on customary law. On the other hand, the attraction of a Zaydi claiming the highest office may vary so that it rather benefits a competing urban power represented by the 'ulama', whose authority varies also from one imām to another. The legitimacy of an imām had to be held at the Grand Mosque and approved by tribal leaders. the sūq space plays a crucial role to choose the Šayḫ of each district and the 'Aqīl (s) of each artery of the sūq. The ceremony an-Nušūr-year is a tangible proof on the rejection of the imām by the community of the city, the tribes and even, by the people of sūq.

However, the political power is considered to be dependent on the Imams' legitimacy. In the Ottoman period, the municipal autonomy has led to the distinction between the Shi'a and the state policy that referred to the ancient organization created by the inhabitants of the city of Ṣan'ā ' and held by the notables of the city. The aim of this exposé, research project, is to analyze the connections between the state and the religious sectarian dogmas in the city of San'a. Such aim is more precisely defined through three main aspects including the emergence of competing authorities (represented by the Imam, the 'Âlim and the 'Âqîl), the organization of the cult place (Mosque) and architectural symbolism, and, finally, the social order as a representation of the two previous aspacts.

'La ville de Ṣan'ā' était sous le règne de plusieurs dynasties dont la plus étendue la dynastie zaydite qui a persisté pratiquement mille ans.'

Le zaydisme est un dogme šī'ite fondé au Yaman par al-Hēdī Yaḥyā ibn al-Ḥusayn. C'est un dogme politico-religieux qui n'a jamais dépassé les hauts plateaux. La ville de Ṣan'ā' a vécu énormément de conflits entre les tenants de la religion (l'imām) et

l'état représenté par un schéma édilitaire hiérarchisé sans toutefois avoir un fondement législatif. Le chef de l'état est le Šayḫ suprême devant obligatoirement avoir un statut de Sayyid (descendant de ʿAlī et Fāṭima).

La ville a réussi à un certain moment à instaurer un pouvoir étatique détenu par des dirigeants hors du dogme zaydite et en s'appuyant sur le droit coutumier. Par ailleurs, la splendeur d'un prétendant zaydite est variable au profit d'un deuxième pouvoir citadin dirigé par les ʿulamāʾ dont le statut est aussi instable d'un imām à un autre. La légitimité d'un prétendant doit avoir lieu à la Grande mosquée et reconnue par les chefs des tribus. Comme l'espace du sūq joue un rôle primordial dans la vie politique de la ville pour choisir le šayḫ de chaque district et les ʿaqīl (s) de chaque artère du sūq. La cérémonie d'an-Nušūr est un véritable témoignage du rejet de l'imām par la collectivité citadine et tribale, voire les gens du sūq.

Néanmoins, le pouvoir politique se voit dépendant de la légitimité des imâms. A l'époque ottomane, l'autonomie municipale a provoqué la distinction entre le pouvoir imamite et l'état politique qui s'apparente à l'ancienne organisation édilitaire créée par les habitants de la ville de Ṣanʿāʾ et tenue par les notables de la ville.

L'objectif de notre exposé, projet de recherche, est d'analyser le rapport de l'état à la coloration sectaire dans la ville de San'a. Cet objectif se définit plus précisément par trois aspects fondamentaux, l'émergence des autorités concurrentes (Imam, ʿAlim et ʿAqîl), l'organisation du lieu de culte (la mosquée) et sa symbolique architecturale, et enfin l'organisation de l'espace publique comme projection des deux aspects précédents.

Marloes Hamelink (Utrecht University): 'Zanzibar, Tanzania and national and religious tensions.'

The rise of religious awareness in Zanzibar is related to ideas about Zanzibari nationalism as part of a global process. Due to the expending access to information,

the population of Zanzibar is becoming more aware of the positions of Muslims in different part of the world and reflect this upon their local situation. Besides, the political religious organization Uamsho spreads religious awareness through various media like radio, mobile phones and Facebook and claims Zanzibar should not be part of the United Republic of Tanzania but be fully independent instead. Many Zanzibari feel they would be better off if they were politically completely independent from the Tanzanian mainland. They project the idea that mainlanders profit economically from Zanzibar on the difference in religious background. On the Tanzanian mainland, about 35 per cent of the population is Muslim, in relation to 99 per cent in Zanzibar. Even though the Tanzanian president is Muslim, many Zanzibari feel Christians have more political power and try to undermine the position of Muslims. Several Zanzibari feel the urge to make their religious background explicit. Muslims become more aware of their position within Zanzibar and Tanzania and public piety is rising. Within my ethnographic fieldwork the theme of religion and state is prominent in the religious and national background of Zanzibari and the tension between Zanzibar and the Tanzanian mainland.

Tamás Szenderák (Eötvös Loránd University): 'The function of state in the light of FatwÁs on QÁt Consumption.'

Religion and State are hardly separable entities in Islamic tradition. The different agents of nation states to some extent still need to cooperate with various religious entities, a feature peculiar to Islamic social structure. One of the key elements of this harmonizing process is religious interpretation (fiqh) that uses different methods and references to deduct particular solutions from the divine law (sharÐÝa) and to reformulate the interpretative connection between tradition and revelation.

In my presentation I aim to scrutinize the oldest remained religious opinion (fatwÁ) written by Ibn ÍaÊar al-HaytamÐ on qÁt consumption and confront it with a contemporary Salafi opinion on the use of the same substance, moreover I attempt to reveal the underlying and diverse conceptions of state by the analysis of the strikingly different logical methods and references applied in the two opinions.

'La fonction de l'Etat à la lumière des fatwas sur la consommation de qat.'
Dans la tradition islamique, la religion et l'Etat sont deux entités difficilement séparables. Dans une certaine mesure, les différents agents des Etats-nations doivent toujours coopérer avec différentes entités religieuses, une caractéristique propre à la structure sociale islamique. Un des éléments essentiels de ce processus d'harmonisation est l'interprétation religieuse (fiqh) qui utilise différentes méthodes et références pour déduire de la loi divine (sharia) des solutions particulières et pour reformuler la connexion interprétative entre tradition et révélation.

Dans ma présentation, je me centre sur l'examen de l'opinion religieuse la plus ancienne (fatwa) écrite par Ibn ÍaÊar al-HaytamÐ sur la consommation de qat et je la confronte avec une opinion salafi contemporaine sur l'utilisation de la même substance ; par ailleurs, j'essaie de révéler les diverses conceptions sous-jacentes de l'Etat par l'analyse des méthodes logiques et des références étonnamment différentes appliquées dans les deux opinions.

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